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ABSTRACT 
The idea of homegrown terrorism is not a new concept, especially considering the history 
of challenges faced by the United States and other Western countries.  However, the 
current violent jihadist problem has overshadowed those past misfortunes in terms of its 
objective and volatility.  What is emergent is the means by which the individuals 
involved in this movement reinforce or possibly operationalize their radicalized behavior.  
The Internet is often that vehicle. 
 Efforts to reform U.S. intelligence have placed increasing value on open source 
information for threat assessments.  Consequently, the open Internet has been targeted in 
search of radical actors, both foreign and homegrown.  Some analysts contend that the 
availability of radical discourse on the Internet presents an opportunity for early 
identification by authorities.  This thesis analyzes the value of open source exploitation of 
the Internet in the domestic counterterrorism role in relation to other detection techniques 
in order to extract best practices and lessons learned for improved intelligence and law 
enforcement activities. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
We assess that globalization trends and recent technological advances 
will continue to enable even small numbers of alienated people to find and 
connect with one another, justify and intensify their anger, and mobilize 
resources to attack—all without requiring a centralized terrorist 
organization, training camp, or leader.1 
-National Intelligence Estimate, July 2007 
When the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) published the 
U.S. Intelligence Community’s assessment of the terrorist threat to the Homeland, it 
solidified what many scholars and intelligence professionals had long speculated.  The 
spread of jihadist websites and related Internet media were contributing to the growth of 
self-radicalized actors in Western societies, to include the United States.2  Dennis Blair’s 
more recent Annual Threat Assessment to the Senate stressed that though successful 
attempts at domestic attacks would be sparse, extremist reinforcement through the 
Internet would continue to play a critical role in the “homegrown” jihadist threat.3  In 
each appraisal, intelligence officials made clear that this contemporary threat poses 
challenges for intelligence and law enforcement efforts. 
Prominent among these challenges is the question of how to best detect, collect, 
and assess homegrown radical activity on the Internet.  The Intelligence Community has 
a history of scouring the cyber realm in search of nefarious activity, sometimes by  
 
                                                 
1 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Intelligence Estimate: The Terrorist Threat 
to the U.S. Homeland (Washington, DC: ODNI, 2007). 
2 Ibid. 
3 Dennis C. Blair, Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community, February 2010, 11.  
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contentious means of its own.4  However, measures that potentially threaten civil liberties 
hold little traction in America as evidenced by society’s desire to return to a sense of 
normalcy in the years following the 9/11 attacks.  
Though covert techniques will invariably remain viable tools, the changing nature 
of threats has called for an evolutions in intelligence methods.  Efforts to reform U.S. 
intelligence have placed increasing value on open source information for threat 
assessments.  Consequently, the open Internet has been targeted in search of radical 
actors, both foreign and homegrown.  This study therefore seeks to answer two questions:  
Does open source exploitation of the Internet provide an effective means for identifying 
homegrown jihadist threats?  If so, what are the best practices, and what can be 
improved?  
B. PURPOSE AND IMPORTANCE 
The idea of homegrown terrorism is not a new concept, especially considering the 
history of challenges faced by other Western countries.  Indeed, even its existence on 
American soil is not particularly modern when one recalls the chronic blight of “eco-
terrorist” events, the Oklahoma City bombing or the wave of bombings carried out by 
domestic terror groups in the San Francisco Bay Area during the 1970s.5  However, the 
current violent jihadist problem has overshadowed those past misfortunes in terms of its  
 
                                                 
4 Examples include the Total Information Awareness program which allowed authorities to eavesdrop 
on Internet communications through wiretaps, and the formerly covert Carnivore system used by the FBI. 
Carnivore was widely criticized for privacy infringement.  See Gabriel Weimann, Terror on the Internet: 
The New Arena, the New Challenges, (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2006), 182–
185.  
5 Overshadowed by the jihadist threat, often forgotten are the violent radical movements of extreme 
environmentalist groups like the Earth Liberation Front (ELF) and the Animal Liberation Front (ALF).  
These two groups alone have accounted for the highest number of domestic terror attacks since 9/11. See 
START Global Terrorism Database, 
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?expanded=no&casualties_type=&casualties_max=&cou
ntry=217&ob=GTDID&od=desc&page=1&count=100#results-table (accessed May 29, 2010).   
   The 1970s experienced a series of politically-driven attacks throughout the Bay Area by groups such 
as the Weather Underground, New World Liberation Front, and the Red Guerilla Army; see “Radicals: 
California’s Underground,” Time.com, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,913516-
1,00.html (accessed May 29, 2010); and Brian Michael Jenkins, “Would-Be Warriors: Incidents of Jihadist 
Terrorist Radicalization in the United States since September 11, 2001,” (Santa Monica: RAND, 2010), 
viii.      
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objective and volatility.  What also is emergent is the means by which the individuals 
involved in this movement reinforce or possibly operationalize their radicalized behavior.  
The Internet is often that vehicle.   
The Internet’s enabling nature is of course a well-researched area of interest, with 
volumes of laudable publications covering the more operative uses of the Internet by 
terrorists (e.g., propaganda, fundraising, targeting, and coordination for attacks).  
Common to many of these works is the call for improved intelligence measures that can 
successfully identify and preempt terrorist activity.  The DNI’s statements indicate the 
call has not fallen on deaf ears and that the Intelligence Community is engaged.  Yet the 
approach with which analysts address homegrown jihadist activity requires evaluation, 
both for its validity and its effectiveness in assessing the threat.  Open source information 
should not hastily be deemed the “golden bullet,” given the overwhelming amount of 
data, which is often incomplete, and the ever-present potential for false leads.  However, 
the availability of radical discourse on the Internet presents an opportunity for early 
identification when individual behaviors are viewed as “part of the continuum of the 
radicalization process.”6  The objective of this research is to analyze the value of open 
source exploitation of the Internet in the homegrown counterterrorism role, while 
extracting best practices and lessons learned for improved detection activities.  This 
contribution hopes to expand the body of knowledge in identifying, disrupting, and 
preventing homegrown jihadist radicalization and attacks, but also has broader 
implications for the development of the open source intelligence discipline. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
  The increased demand for open source information in the Intelligence Community 
has sparked debate among policymakers and scholars.  This debate by and large focuses 
on the relative value of open source information.  Though intelligence professionals 
                                                 
6 Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt, “Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat,” report by 
the New York City Police Department, 2007, 10. 
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generally agree that open source information can be useful during collection and analysis, 
many still consider its use secondary to traditional clandestine activities.7 
 Historically, open sources have taken the back seat due to the conventional 
mindset of the Intelligence Community.  Amy Sands argues that organizations within the 
Intelligence Community largely have understood their roles as collectors and assessors of 
secrets, thereby justifying the need for clandestine activities.8  Directing attention to the 
collection and assessment of open source information would seem to detract from the 
organizations’ conceptions of their primary purpose.9  Some policymakers further 
promote this view, tending to believe that sifting through open source material rarely 
unveils an adversary’s intentions.10  Sands criticizes this view, arguing that open source 
information can “complement, supplement, clarify, and frame the ‘secrets’ uncovered via 
human and technical means.”11  In some cases, she says open sources may prevail over 
other methods of collection.   
 Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, greater attention has been directed toward the 
specific role of the Internet in America’s counterterrorism strategy.  Critics fear that 
increased government intervention in the cyber realm translates into intrusion on 
American privacy.12  The National Security Agency’s Terrorist Surveillance Program and 
the Federal Bureau of Investigations’ Digital Collection System (formerly known as 
“Carnivore”) have been harshly criticized.  Designed to collect electronic 
communications, these systems are reportedly capable of tracking e-mail headers, sender 
and destination identities, financial transactions, and Internet browsing history—
                                                 
7 Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt, “Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat,” report by 
the New York City Police Department, 2007, 64; Richard A. Best, Jr. and Alfred Cumming, “Open Source 
Intelligence (OSINT): Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service Report RL34270, December 
5, 2007, 2. 
8 Amy Sands, “Integrating Open Sources into Transnational Threat Assessments,” in Jennifer E. Sims 
and Burton Gerber, eds., Transforming U.S. Intelligence (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 
2005), 64.  
9 Ibid. 
10 Best and Cumming, “Open Source Intelligence (OSINT): Issues for Congress,” 2.  
11 Sands, “Integrating Open Sources into Transnational Threat Assessments,” 64. 
12 Siobhan Gorman, “NSA’s Domestic Spying grows as Agency sweeps up Data,” Wall Street Journal 
website, March 10, 2008, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120511973377523845.html (accessed May 29, 
2010); Transcript of Hearing before the Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism 
Risk Assessment, “Using Open-Source Information Effectively,” June 21, 2005, 3.  
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unbeknownst to the target individual.13  Some believe that this capability carries too large 
of a potential for misuse.  Though measures should be taken to guard against the jihadist 
threat, organizations such as the American Civil Liberties Union and the Center for 
Democracy and Technology warn that the government’s spy programs put American civil 
liberties at stake.14  Supporters of open source methods proclaim that open Internet 
exploitation provides a viable solution to this problem.  Open source information is by 
definition publicly available material that anyone can lawfully obtain by request, 
purchase, or observation.15  As such, the use of open sources is regarded as contributing 
to improved accountability and oversight of the Intelligence Community.16  Recognition 
of this feature, some contend, enhances the ability to confront the challenges posed by 
modern terrorism.   
 Advocates of open sources argue that exploiting the Internet’s permissive nature 
is vital to understanding the ongoing jihadist threat.  Frances Townsend, former Assistant 
to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, stresses that open source 
information drawn from the Internet is indispensible.  Intelligence products compiled by 
the National Open Source Center (NOSC) frequently were included in many of the 
briefings she gave to the president, and also were made available to federal, state, and 
local officials.17  Townsend claims that much of what the Intelligence Community now 
knows about jihadists is derived from their own “statements, blogs, videos, and chat 
sessions on the Internet.”18  Terrorism scholar Gabriel Weimann adds to this stance, 
                                                 
13 Siobhan Gorman, “NSA’s Domestic Spying grows as Agency sweeps up Data,” Wall Street Journal 
website, March 10, 2008, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120511973377523845.html (accessed May 29, 
2010); Transcript of Hearing before the Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism 
Risk Assessment, “Using Open-Source Information Effectively,” June 21, 2005, 3. 
14 Gabriel Weimann, Terror on the Internet: The New Arena, the New Challenges, (Washington, DC: 
United States Institute of Peace Press, 2006), 218–219. 
15 Best and Cumming, “Open Source Intelligence (OSINT): Issues for Congress,” 5–6. 
16 Robert D. Steele, “Open Source Intelligence,” in Loch Johnson , ed., Strategic Intelligence: The 
Intelligence Cycle (Westport: Praeger, 2007), 111. 
17 Frances Fragos Townsend, transcript of address given to the ODNI Open Source Conference, July 
16, 2007, in Washington, DC, ODNI website, http://www.dni.gov/speeches/20070716_speech_2.pdf 
(accessed May 30, 2010). 
18 Ibid. 
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claiming that analysis of online jihadist rhetoric can often reveal radical actors’ 
justifications and motivations for transitioning to violent actions.19   
Compelling as these statements are, criticisms still remain concerning how the 
implementation of open source initiatives address more internal problems.  Townsend 
praises the work done by the NOSC to identify and track thousands of jihadist websites 
from around the world and engage terrorism in the new Internet “battlefield.”20  Richard 
Best and Alfred Cumming, however, note that the NOSC currently falls under the 
administrative control of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).  They highlight that 
such organizational placement constrains the NOSC’s ability to truly “support law 
enforcement agencies and state, local, and tribal entities.”21  The National Security Act’s 
statutory prohibition of CIA participation in law enforcement activities essentially bars 
the NOSC from collecting information directly on activities within the United States.22  
This limitation is especially significant for organizations like the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS), which have a vested interest in homegrown threats. 
 Another important area of concern revolves around the use of private firms for 
open source information and technologies.  The establishment of the NOSC was meant to 
provide the Intelligence Community with its own robust open source capability.  Yet the 
NOSC is meant to analyze a broad range of national security intelligence issues, not just 
terrorism.  In addition, some of its personnel are on temporary assignments in other 
agencies.23  In an effort to supplement the deficiency, a number of independent 
researchers have established private firms specializing in terrorism monitoring on the 
Internet.   
 Because analysts in organizations like the Search for International Terrorist 
Entities (SITE) Institute and the Investigative Project often do not possess security 
clearances, their daily work relies entirely upon open source exploitation of the 
                                                 
19 Weimann, Terror on the Internet, 54–58. 
20 Townsend, transcript of address given to the ODNI Open Source Conference, July 16, 2007, in 
Washington, DC. 
21 Best and Cumming, “Open Source Intelligence (OSINT): Issues for Congress,” 20. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid., 12. 
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Internet.24  Rita Katz, head of the SITE institute, argues that she and others like her who 
zealously pore over open source information on the Internet have been able to effectively 
supplement the work of other intelligence professionals.  She states that the obsession she 
and her peers share to diligently follow online jihadist discourse has enabled them to 
produce timely assessments for the people that need them most.25  Critics, 
understandably, question the viability of private groups with limited resources in 
comparison to the larger government agencies.  Steven Aftergood from the Federation of 
American Scientists challenges, “Intelligence analysis is a set of skills that you learn, not 
just something that anyone can walk in off the street and pick up.”26  Other critics, such 
as Brian Jenkins, a senior researcher with the RAND Corporation who has studied 
terrorism for over thirty years, are wary of the motives and credentials of rising private 
groups.27  However, prominent terrorism scholars like Gabriel Weimann, Bruce 
Hoffman, Marc Sageman, and Jarret Brachman are increasingly associated with 
renowned private firms, which may lend credibility and expert advisory to these currently 
controversial resources.28    
 In addition to the debate regarding private firms is the concern of the emerging 
technologies used to carry out the business of Internet sweeping.  Not unlike the 
government’s Terrorist Surveillance Program mentioned earlier, private technology 
initiatives that “sniff” the Internet in search of terrorists are being questioned.  Weimann 
cites the National Institute for Systems Test and Productivity, whose online tools monitor 
traffic and sweep e-mails for terrorist indicators.29  The problem here is that these tools 
go beyond what is considered open source.  An alternative that is still in development is 
                                                 
24 Weimann, Terror on the Internet, 191-192.  
25 Benjamin Wallace-Wells, “Private Jihad: How Rita Katz got into the spying business,” The New 
Yorker, May 29, 2006, 1-2. 
26 Wallace-Wells, “Private Jihad: How Rita Katz got into the spying business,” 2. 
27 Weimann, Terror on the Internet, 191. 
28 Bruce Hoffman and Gabriel Weimann are both listed as Senior Advisors to the Site Intel Group, 
Marc Sageman is the founder of Sageman Consulting, LLC, and Jarret Brachman conducts private 
consulting in addition to his academic work.  See, respectively, https://www.siteintelgroup.com; 
http://www.fpri.org/about/people/sageman.html; http://jarretbrachman.net/?page_id=17 (accessed May 29, 
2010).  
29 Weimann, Terror on the Internet, 190.  
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the University of Arizona’s Dark Web research project.  Developed by a team of 
computer scientists and terrorism researchers, the Dark Web portal relies solely on open 
source collection for modeling and research.  Using a variety of “multilingual data 
mining, text mining, and Web mining techniques” the team has been able to conduct 
“link analysis, content analysis, Webmetrics (technical sophistication) analysis, sentiment 
analysis, authorship analysis, and video analysis” of jihadist content.30  The project team 
stresses that their work is not like Total Information Awareness and that their research 
targets international terrorists and jihadist groups, not “regular citizens.”31  However, the 
team may soon find itself coming across evidence of homegrown radicals who have 
reached out to fellow jihadists on the Internet.  In this case, the Dark Web project, given 
its scholarly roots and emphasis on respect for civil liberties, may prove particularly 
helpful in identifying radical threats in the homeland.  
 Given the issues just presented, many argue the fundamental challenge that still 
remains is a lack of widely accepted metrics for the use of the Internet and open sources.  
Best and Cumming remark that visits to the NOSC’s website opensource.gov are 
monitored and counts are taken of how many times open source analyses make it into the 
President’s Daily Brief.32  Yet, these trivial measures reveal little about effectiveness.  
Best and Cumming offer that the ultimate metric really is the quality of analysis and the 
pressure of potentially reflecting ignorance of information that is publicly available.33   
 Focused on homeland issues, Jin Kim and William Allard propose applying the 
military’s Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) framework to assess the utility 
of Internet-derived information.  They argue that the IPB’s systematic, layered approach 
allows analysts to track both terrorist adversary and source by means of event  
 
 
                                                 
30 The University of Arizona, “Dark Web Terrorism Research,” University of Arizona website, 
http://ai.arizona.edu/research/terror/ (accessed April 26, 2010). 
31 Ibid. 
32 Best and Cumming, “Open Source Intelligence (OSINT): Issues for Congress,” 17.  
33 Ibid. 
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templates.34  Coupled with a radicalization project owned by DHS, Kim and Allard assert 
that the IPB would focus collection and provide timely feedback to decision makers and 
planners.35 
Lucy Resnyansky takes a slightly different approach, arguing that intelligence 
professionals first need a change in mindset in order to realize the impact of open source 
information.  She maintains that the Internet must be viewed in its social context, rather 
than as an information repository.36  Resnyansky states that terrorist data from the 
Internet is produced in a vague field of opinion (such as blogs), which can be misleading 
for analysts.  To avoid this pitfall, she argues, analysts should approach the data with a 
social-cultural perspective and conduct meta-analyses of the context in which the 
information was presented.37  By understanding the social circumstances (institutional 
discourses, cultural values, actors’ interests, etc) of the collected information, analysts are 
better able to determine the information’s relevance to a potential threat.38  Resnyansky 
argues that in order to make sense of what is happening on the Internet and to garner 
tangible results, the Intelligence Community needs to “acquire the epistemological 
mindset characteristic of qualitative social research.”39  Adopting a sociological mindset 
and its associated technological tools, she contends, enables analysts to capture the 
qualitative characteristics of Internet open sources needed to produce meaningful threat 
analyses authorities can count on.40 
D. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
There are two hypotheses that can be generated based upon the literature.  The 
first is that current open source exploitation of the Internet is only marginally effective in 
                                                 
34 Jin Kim and William Allard, “Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace: A Methodology for 
Homeland Security Intelligence Analysis,” SAIS Review, vol. XXVII, no. 1 (Winter-Spring, 2008), 83. 
35 Ibid., 85. 
36 Lucy Resnyansky, “The Internet and the Changing Nature of Intelligence,” IEEE Technology and 
Society Magazine, vol. 28, no. 1 (2009), 45. 
37 Resnyansky, “The Internet and the Changing Nature of Intelligence.” 




identifying homegrown threats.  These authors make the case that while there may be an 
abundance of open source information online, this data may not always promise “an 
equivalent amount of open source intelligence.”41 Additionally, Abram Shulsky and Gary 
Schmitt argue that the frequent questionability of quality data drawn from Internet 
forums, and the credibility of sources, may be a hindrance in providing timely and 
actionable intelligence.42  In this case, open source exploitation is better viewed as 
merely a foundation for effective classified intelligence and covert actions.43  
On the other hand, the second hypothesis based on other writings is that open 
source exploitation of the Internet is a considerably effective means for identifying and 
assessing homegrown radicalization.  Advocates such as retired Naval intelligence officer 
Dr. John Gannon, president of BAE Systems’ Intelligence and Security, and John Jardine, 
president of Open Source Publishing, Inc., argue that the availability of sophisticated 
search engines, language translation tools, social network analysis programs, geospatial 
software, and the assistance of motivated private firms allows analysts to evaluate open 
source data online rapidly while focused on key identifiers of extremist activity.44  This 
thesis will investigate documented cases of American homegrown jihadists to see which 
of the claims hold true. 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis will apply a qualitative examination of homegrown jihadist incidents 
in the United States since 9/11 to study the effectiveness of open source exploitation of 
the Internet in assessing jihadist threats.  Ten cases are selected from the population of 46 
incidents presented in the 2010 RAND report, “Would-Be Warriors: Incidents of Jihadist 
Terrorist Radicalization in the United States since September 11, 2001.”  The report 
defines homegrown jihadists as individuals who lived in the United States and in many 
                                                 
41 Sands, “Integrating Open Sources into Transnational Threat Assessments,” 66. 
42 Abram N. Shulsky and Gary J. Schmitt, Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence 
(Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2002), 142. 
43 Steele, “Open Source Intelligence,” 96. 
44 Individual testimonies before the Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and 
Terrorism Risk Assessment found in “Using Open-Source Information Effectively,” Serial No. 109-22 
(Washington, DC: GPO, 2007), 9–15. 
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cases plotted to conduct attacks against the homeland, provided material support to 
foreign terrorist organizations, or left the country to join jihadist organizations abroad.45  
For the purpose of this thesis, cases are chosen to represent the span of incidents across 
the homeland.  As such, the locations referenced correspond to the city and state in which 
the homegrown plot was ultimately foiled and the perpetrators detained.  This also 
affords the opportunity to investigate the measures taken by federal, state, and local 
entities in each region.  For example, though the FBI as a whole embraces the same 
general mission set, each regional division encounters region-specific circumstances that 
may influence their approaches.   
 Drawing from legal documents, scholarly works, and news reports, the selected 
cases are investigated with the purpose of extracting those sources of information, or 
indicators, which alerted authorities to the radical threat.  Each indicator is then classified 
under one the following general categories: interpersonal; Inernet-Based; incident reports 
and watchlist alerts; documents, media, and material; or confidential.  These categories 
are meant to capture a broad range of sources available to authorities.  The interpersonal 
category refers to those types of person-to-person interactions that occur in close social 
environments, such as the workplace or religious establishment, which may provide 
reports of suspicious behavior.  Friendship and kinship ties fall under this category, as 
relatives and friends may be the first to identify unusual activities of a radicalized 
individual.  Inernet-Based sources include, but are not limited to, publicly available 
material found online in chat rooms, social networking sites, extremist websites, public 
records, and even commercial online sources that require a fee for access.  The incident 
reports and watchlist alerts category captures the automatic reporting that is generated 
from public safety incidents such as traffic stops, domestic disturbances, or neighborhood 
watch tip-offs.  Included in this category are red flags generated by travel to countries 
listed as state sponsors of terrorism or as terrorist safe havens.  Documents, media, and 
Material refers to commonly available sources such as newspapers, videos, and CDs, and 
other material items that may be discovered during the course of investigation.  Lastly, 
                                                 
45 Brian Michael Jenkins, “Would-Be Warriors: Incidents of Jihadist Terrorist Radicalization in the 
United States since September 11, 2001,” RAND Corporation Occasional Paper 292, 2010, vii.  
 12
the confidential sources category indicates information gathered from undercover means 
or recruited contacts.  Table 1 illustrates examples of information sources for each 
category that may be found in the investigated cases. 
Interpersonal 
Interaction








Legal infractions (traffic stops, 
domestic violence, etc) Videos
Undercover 
agents






Passport/Visa applications for 
travel to countries designated 




Familial ties Online public records  
Figure 1.   Examples of sources that may indicate Jihadist threat 
 In order to understand the effectiveness of Internet exploitation in each case 
investigated, all applicable source categories must be measured against a set of metrics.  
Evaluating the relative value of each factor affords a better understanding of its 
contribution to the assessment of the homegrown jihadist threat.  Therefore, drawing 
upon valuation metrics offered by Robert David Steele, each category as displayed above 
is appraised using the following queries: 
• Was the information “good enough” at the time of discovery, therefore allowing 
timely intervention? 
• Did the information provide, in context, “good enough” understanding to move 
forward with investigation or intervention? 
• Was the information shared in order to attract other useful information?46 
The goal of this method is to provide a holistic view of the homegrown threat 
assessments in order to determine if use of the open Internet did indeed contribute 
                                                 
46 Steele, “Open Source Intelligence,” 143.  
 13
significantly.  Certainly, it may be discovered that in some cases the Internet was not 
applicable at all.  Even so, the absence of its use may be telling of a latent deficiency or 
highlight the relevance of a more effective tactic.  In cases in which the Internet was 
found to be applicable, the revelations may illuminate practices and techniques that 
deserve increased application or have potential for improvement.   
The roadmap for this thesis is as follows:  Chapter II will begin with a historical 
background, illustrating the increased concerns of terrorism researchers and the 
Intelligence Community regarding jihadist extremism on the Internet.  Tracing the rise of 
terrorist Internet activity on the transnational scale, this background explores hallmark 
intelligence assessments from the Intelligence Community that warned of America’s new 
homegrown threat and discusses the reasons governing the increased emphasis on open 
source exploitation of the Internet.  Chapter III provides a comprehensive overview of the 
current issues surrounding the collection and use of open source Internet information, 
ranging from information volume management to privacy concerns.  Chapter IV presents 
each of the selected case studies as applied to the model presented above, with the goal of 
elucidating the success, shortcomings, or non-applicability of open source Internet 
exploitation.  Given the results of the case studies, the concluding chapter will provide an 
overview of best practices and areas for improvement, leading into an informed and 
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II. THE GROWING CONCERN OVER JIHAD ON THE NET 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Globalization trends have changed the dynamics of security and intelligence.  
Technological breakthroughs continue to sharpen America’s offensive and defensive 
capabilities while providing once unimaginable access to critical information.  
Conversely, innovative tools like the Internet have given America’s terrorist adversaries 
an opportunity to challenge national security from afar and within the homeland.   
 The concern over homegrown jihadist and other terror-related Internet activity has 
been gradual.  It has only recently become a prominent issue of national concern, as 
evidenced by John Brennan’s May 26, 2010 speech to the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies: 
Knowing that it is harder to penetrate America’s defenses, the likes of    
al-Qaida’s Adam Gadahn and Anwar al-Awlaki in Yemen, American 
citizens who understand our society, our strengths as well as our 
vulnerabilities, not only plan attacks, they use the Internet and extremist 
websites to exhort people already living in the United States to take up 
arms and launch terrorist attacks from within.  Indeed, we have seen an 
increasing number of individuals here in the United States become 
captivated by extremist ideologies or causes. Somali Americans from 
Minnesota traveling to fight in Somalia, the five Virginia men who went 
to Pakistan seeking terrorist training, David Headley, the Chicago man 
charged with helping to plan the Mumbai attacks, the Pennsylvania 
woman, JihadJane, charged with conspiring to murder a Danish cartoonist.  
The president’s national security strategy explicitly recognizes the threat 
to the United States posed by individuals radicalized here at home.47      
A relatively small number of researchers, on the other hand, have been tracing 
this particular Internet trend since before 9/11.  Much of their early research, however, 
focused on fairly well-known international organizations and less on the possible 
emergence of loose affiliations within the United States.  It was not until after the release 
of the 9/11 Commission Report in July 2004 that greater attention was paid to the latter 
                                                 
47 John Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, transcript of 
speech given to Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 26, 2010, Washington, DC. 
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by the Intelligence Community (IC).  Common discoveries in both scholarly and 
intelligence arenas illuminated the need for an improved strategy that could deliver 
warning and opportunities for disruption.  This chapter provides a brief historical 
background illustrating the early warnings by terrorism researchers and the increased 
concerns of the Intelligence Community regarding jihadist extremism facilitated by the 
Internet.  It traces the evolution of hallmark intelligence assessments from the 
Intelligence Community that warned of America’s new homegrown threat.  Furthermore, 
it discusses reasons behind the increased emphasis on exploiting the open source nature 
of the Internet. 
B. PERSPECTIVES FROM THE TERRORISM RESEARCH COMMUNITY 
Terrorists were using the Internet before the attacks on 9/11.  Despite its relative 
newness, the medium was immediately recognized as a powerful tool by established 
terrorist organizations.  By 1999, almost all thirty groups designated as terrorist 
organizations by the U.S. Department of State were on the Internet.48  A year prior, Clark 
Staten of the Emergency Response and Research Institute (ERRI) addressed a U.S. 
Senate subcommittee, stating that “even small terrorist groups are now using the Internet 
to broadcast their message and misdirect/misinform the general population in multiple 
nations simultaneously.”49  Both terrorists and terrorism researchers understood early on 
the Internet’s utility for propaganda and coercion. 
Terrorism scholar Gabriel Weimann has followed this development from its early 
stages and has produced some compelling revelations.  In his book Terror on the 
Internet: The New Arena, the New Challenges, Weimann discusses his findings from the 
systematic investigation of a database of thousands of terrorist websites compiled from 
1998–2005.50  He argues chiefly that it should come as no surprise that terrorists turned 
to the Internet as it became available.  The opportunity to affect mass media was 
                                                 
48 Weimann, Terror on the Internet: The New Arena, the New Challenges, 15. 
49 Clark Staten, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism and Government 
Information, U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, February 24, 1998; quoted in Dorothy Denning, 
Information Warfare and Security (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1999), 68. 
50 Weimann, Terror on the Internet: The New Arena, the New Challenges, 4. 
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attractive and an effective way to voice their goals and concerns.  It also was, and still is, 
“a useful channel of communication, linking terrorists and their followers, spreading 
propaganda and instructions, launching psychological scare campaigns, and networking 
terrorist groups and organizations.”51        
The mid-to-late 1990s saw increased growth in society’s use of the Internet, as the 
new means for social interaction, information access, and marketing became ever more 
appealing.52  The fruits of globalization, it appeared, were unlocking new doors for peace 
and prosperity.  Weimann notes, however, that those claims were soon challenged as the 
Internet’s unregulated environment was invaded by pornography, violent images, and 
extremist content of various types.53  This new communicative space played favorably 
for violent politically-motivated groups looking to improve their tactics.  In 1996 for 
instance, the Palestinian group Hamas was reported to have used “chat rooms and e-mail 
to plan and coordinate operations in Gaza, the West Bank, and Lebanon.”54  During this 
same period, the Lebanese Hezbollah established a number of websites to report 
successful attacks against Israel, while the Irish Republican Army (IRA) took advantage 
of the Internet to garner sensitive information about British army bases.55  Still in its 
early existence, the Internet provided both communicative and operational advantages to 
well-known terrorist organizations. 
1. Jihad Goes Online  
Jihadist terror group Al Qaeda gained instantaneous global infamy after executing 
the 9/11 attacks.  The Internet helped spread its notoriety.  Yet prior to those events, the 
                                                 
51 Weimann, Terror on the Internet: The New Arena, the New Challenges, 25. 
52 D. Rushkoff, Coercion: Why We Listen to What ‘They’ Say (New York, NY: Riverhead, 1999); 
cited in Lucy Resnyansky, “The Internet and the Changing Nature of Intelligence,” IEEE Technology and 
Society Magazine, vol. 28, no. 1 (2009), 45. 
53 Weimann, Terror on the Internet: The New Arena, the New Challenges, 19. 
54 “Israel: U.S. Hamas Activists Use Internet to Send Attack Threats,” Tel Aviv IDF Radio, FBIS-
TOT-97-001-L, October 13, 1996; cited in Steven A. Hildreth, “Cyberwarfare,” Congressional Research 
Service Report RL30735, June 19, 2001, 15. 
55 Ibid. 
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group had only maintained one website (www.alneda.com).56  Edna Reid and Hsinchun 
Chen, senior researchers at the University of Arizona, note that at the time this one site 
was primarily a propaganda posting board for “’official statements,’ reports, and videos 
from senior members of the al-Qaeda movement.”57  While counterterrorism officials and 
Internet service providers (ISP) took the site offline following 9/11, “mirror images” of 
Alneda frequently reappeared over a two year period on different ISPs or embedded 
within legitimate sites.58  It soon became apparent that blocking or removing the site 
were only temporary fixes.  Meanwhile, the jihadist movement, and subsequently its 
Internet use, was undergoing a dynamic change. 
The catastrophic events against the U.S. homeland triggered intense repercussions 
for Al Qaeda.  A U.S.-led coalition was formed to strike at the heart of the jihadist group, 
which was known to operate terrorist training camps in Afghanistan.59  This persistent 
campaign to capture and kill Al Qaeda members significantly degraded the organization 
as it once was.  Some claim however that this weakening was only transitory and that the 
jihadist movement merely adapted with the help of the Internet.60    
In his controversial book Leaderless Jihad, Marc Sageman argues that the 
targeting and diffusion of the Al Qaeda core encouraged the adoption of a decentralized 
structure.  Linked by the Internet, modern jihadists and supporters were empowered to act 
independently or in small cells across a global network.61  Diffusion, Sageman remarks, 
                                                 
56 Weimann, Terror on the Internet: The New Arena, the New Challenges, 67. 
57 Edna Reid and Hsinchun Chen, “Extremist Social Movement Groups and their Online Digital 
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58 Weimann, Terror on the Internet: The New Arena, the New Challenges, 67–68. 
59 President George W. Bush, “Bush announces start of a ‘War on Terror,’” on GlobalSecurity 
website, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2001/09/mil-010920-usia01.htm (accessed 
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60 H. Brinton Milward and Jorg Raab, “Dark Networks as Organizational Problems: Elements of a 
Theory,” International Public Management Journal, vol. 9, no. 3 (2006), 13–14. 
61 Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2008) 126, 143. 
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served as a means for keeping the terror campaign alive.62  The present-day idea of Al 
Qaeda has instead become inspiration rather than a controlling agency.63 
Sageman believes that direction within this “leaderless” movement comes 
predominantly from the ongoing discourse on the Internet.  Prominent Al Qaeda 
figureheads, even those who are now dead, still remain as topics of discussion and 
sources of inspiration for rising jihadists.64  Scott Atran from the University of 
Michigan’s Institute for Social Research agrees, stating that these types of focal points 
help individual radicals reach out to a larger jihadist community, though these persons 
may be geographically separated and unrelated.65  These observations have led some in 
the West to shift concern from afar to potentially more local threats. 
Jarret Brachman, former research director of West Point’s Combating Terrorism 
Center, contends that Al Qaeda’s strategic transformation has advanced the jihadist 
movement onto the global scale.  In particular, he finds that the effect on the West has 
increased substantially.  Citing the perpetrators of the 2006 Fort Dix plot and 2009 Fort 
Hood attack, he argues that the English-speaking jihadist has reached a point where he is 
indistinguishable from Arabic-speaking counterparts in terms of commitment and 
knowledge of the movement.66 The presence of English translations of key literature, 
media, and frequent discourse on the Internet are largely responsible for this evolution. 
Brachman has labeled emerging online Western extremists as “jihobbyists.”67  
While the term is intended to be somewhat satirical, he stresses it carries a serious 
connotation.  Self-radicalized individuals, seeking affirmation, turn to the Internet for 
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support.   By continually exposing themselves to ideologically sound propaganda on the 
Internet, these individuals harden their convictions.68  These new actors may lack the 
authoritative direction that typified the traditional Al Qaeda organization.  Yet recent 
events such as the one involving Colleen LaRose (online alias “JihadJane”) from 
Philadelphia warn of the extent the modern jihadist will go to commit violence even from 
within U.S. borders.69  Raphael Perl observes that if such trends continue, there can be an 
expected increase in small, localized attacks carried out by who he labels as “micro 
actors.”70  The characteristics of these micro actors—homegrown, technologically savvy, 
diverse in background, and loosely connected to other groups—make detection and 
disruption of their activities challenging.71    
Of course, not all agree completely with the claims of Weimann, Sageman, et al.  
For example, David Tucker of the Defense Analysis Department at the Naval 
Postgraduate School argues that the Internet has not had a transformative effect on 
terrorist interaction.  While he agrees that the Internet may facilitate communication 
among ‘would-be’ radicals, Tucker asserts that it does not replace the value of face-to-
face interaction, which more often than not occurs first in potential terrorist 
relationships.72  Challenging further, he says “the Internet may make it easier to find 
accomplices in geographically dispersed places, coordinate with them, and get plans for a 
bomb, but terrorists did all these things before the Internet existed.”73   
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Bruce Hoffman, a notably preeminent terrorism scholar, fundamentally disagrees 
with Sageman’s assessment about Al Qaeda’s present status and relevance to national 
security.  While he too has followed the trend of terrorist Internet use and advocated for 
increased concern, Hoffman asserts that it is the Internet that “has become something of a 
virtual sanctuary” for Al Qaeda’s continued function.74  In his scathing retort “The Myth 
of Grass-Roots Terrorism,” he dismisses as folly Sageman’s claims that Al Qaeda the 
organization is “dead” and asserts that the terrorist group is more than ever an alive-and-
well threat to the U.S.  As the title portends, Hoffman’s article belittles the concept of 
homegrown jihadism.  Instead, the argument made is that Al Qaeda exists today in the 
form of sleeper cells, products of a “long-standing campaign of subversion,”75 that 
effectively use the Internet for propaganda and sustained recruitment.76 
A more recent, and thought-provoking, set of observations is offered by Gilbert 
Ramsay who views the general issue of terrorists on the Internet to be overblown and of 
little concern.  First, he contends, the image of terrorist manipulation of the technology is 
exaggerated and presented as an abnormal use of the same functionalities afforded to 
non-terrorists.77  Addressing Weiman’s assertion that the 9/11 hijackers “used the 
Internet, and used it well,” Ramsay questions whether this statement really amounts to 
anything significant: 
They may indeed have ‘used the Internet well’ – but did they, in most 
respects a normal group of Western educated middle class Arabs, use the 
Internet any better, or any differently than their peers? If not, then the 
implication is that terrorist use of the Internet is, to this extent, an 
unremarkable correlate of the age, education and socioeconomic status of 
the individuals concerned.78 
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In other words, it is difficult to claim that terrorists gain an edge by using the Internet for 
an agenda they would pursue anyway. Second, Ramsay argues that “terrorist use of the 
Internet…is a terrorist problem only when it leads to terrorism in real life.”79  He 
believes concerns over the presumed threat presented by online chatter ignorantly shifts 
concern from the real damage that terrorism can cause in physical space.80  This leads 
into his principal claim that establishing terrorist use of the Internet as a problem to be 
directly solved is futile and unnecessarily expensive.81  Rather, promoting the 
government’s ability to take action in the “real world”—where its power is strongest—is 
likely to have greater affect on terrorists who try to take advantage of any media.82  
Though he does not address specifically the issue of U.S. homegrown jihadists, Ramsay’s 
arguments imply the same prescription for any shade of terrorism.   
 Discussion in academic circles over the importance of terrorist Internet use, while 
in dispute, has in the least illuminated two considerations.  The first is that the extensive 
body of data about jihadist operations and communications, gathered from the Internet by 
scholars, foretells of a lucrative intelligence capability that could possibly support law 
enforcement and counterterrorism authorities.  Secondly, it highlights a potential avenue 
for better understanding jihadist operatives within the U.S., regardless of whether or not 
direct ties to Al Qaeda exist.  The fact remains that American citizens with diverse 
demographics are engaging in jihadist activities—and that is a quandary.  For the 
Intelligence Community and other counterterrorism professionals, these same 
considerations have progressively grown in significance and beckon new, smart ways to 
approach them.        
C. THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CATCHES ON 
Presently, the concerns over homegrown jihadists and their leveraging of the 
Internet are on the scope of the IC’s upper echelon.  As noted in this chapter’s 
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introduction, the president’s “right-hand man” for homeland security and 
counterterrorism has voiced that part of the nation’s latest security strategy is aimed at 
dealing with the problem.  This decision comes as a culmination of over a decade of 
intelligence reporting and estimates that wrestled with defining the emerging trends.  
Although the IC had been tracking the issue of international terrorism since the 1980s,83 
the 9/11 attacks brought forth the concern that there were gaps in the understanding of 
Islamic extremist groups.  Similar to the findings from the scholarly field, the intelligence 
profession observed an increase in small, diffuse groups or single actors engaging in 
jihadist activity throughout the West following the U.S.-led campaign in Afghanistan.  
While analysts projected early on that the spread of information technologies like the 
Internet would likely abet the wide spectrum of potential adversaries (disaffected states, 
transnational terrorists, proliferators, narcotraffickers, and organized criminals),84 the tie-
in with domestically-formed jihadists was not an immediate assessment.  As suggested by 
a number of authoritative appraisals, this gap may be attributed to a focus on other 
homeland threats that seemed pressing at the time.  The next section will review Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) reports on terrorism from the 1996 to 1999 timeframe to 
help illustrate this claim.  In the succeeding section, a number of estimates from 
throughout the Intelligence Community, culminating in the release of the National 
Intelligence Estimate from the IC’s leading body, reveal the shift in emphasis and a rising 
consensus on the need to address homegrown radicals who use the Internet.  
1. Assessments: 1996 to 1999  
The 1996 FBI annual terrorism report briefly mentioned how the Internet and 
other communications systems were effectively used by right-wing terrorists and the 
militia movement.85  Similarly, the 1997 report noted that the means for carrying out 
attacks by both “domestic right-wing terrorists and extremist religious cults” would 
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expand as information related to weapons of mass destruction proliferated on the World 
Wide Web.86  In 1998, the FBI report observed that “cyber tools and methods…may find 
their way into the hands of terrorists.”87  The latter statement was primarily a reference to 
the threat of cyber attacks;88 however, it was followed thereafter by the statement that 
“terrorists are known to use information technology and the Internet to formulate plans, 
raise funds, spread propaganda, and communicate securely.”  This is important as it 
suggested that the federal agency was beginning to take greater interest in the darker side 
of information technology.  This assertion was validated the following year in the 1999 
report where there were over six references to Internet use by domestic eco-terror groups 
(namely the extremist animal/environmental rights groups, Animal Liberation Front 
(ALF) and Earth Liberation Front (ELF)).   
Although it was apparent that ALF, ELF, and right-wing extremists were the 
immediate domestic priorities, the 1999 report, interestingly, provided an assessment that 
would sound remarkably familiar in the coming decade.  The broad message delivered by 
the following passages bears significance: 
In fact, a growing number of movements…are international in scope and 
exploit the nearly universal communication opportunities of the Internet to 
disseminate propaganda, coordinate activities, and issue claims of 
responsibility for extremist activities.89 
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The communications opportunities afforded by the World Wide Web can 
be expected to have a far-reaching impact on the ability of contemporary 
extremist groups to perpetuate propaganda and attract new members.90 
The United States may be experiencing the third major wave of domestic 
terrorism evident since the 1960s…While these violent special interest 
movements share similarities with previous extremist movements, they 
also possess unique features that present new challenges to law 
enforcement. One of the most potentially troubling of these is the 
decentralized nature of most contemporary special interest extremist 
movements. In confronting more formalized left- and right-wing groups in 
the past, law enforcement successfully neutralized many of these 
organizations by arresting their leaders and dismantling their 
organizational structures. Such a strategy would have limited impact on 
less centralized, more broad-based, movements.91   
These statements marked an important change in perspective.  Though the FBI was 
regarded more for its law enforcement aptitude versus its intelligence capability, these 
early assessments indicate that the organization was to some degree trying to monitor the 
shifting character of terrorism within the homeland.  Clearly, there was recognition of a 
decentralized trend among contemporary extremists.  The Internet appeared to be a 
common facilitator.  However, an authoritative connection to the jihadist movement was 
not made at the time; and certainly not to such a movement generating from within U.S. 
borders.  Still, it is interesting to note that in the section titled “Trends in International 
Terrorism” of the 1999 report, there was a significant discussion about Al Qaeda and its 
loose affiliations of violent radicals.  Specifically, it said that “As the 21st Century 
dawns, the most direct threat to U.S. interests may stem from Usama Bin Laden, his 
organization Al-Qaeda, and sympathetic groups”92 and “should either he or Al-Qaeda 
cease to exist this international movement would, in all likelihood, continue.”93  
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2. Assessments: 2000 to 2007  
 Understandably, the 9/11 attacks were of primary focus in the FBI’s “Terrorism 
2000/2001” report.  The Al Qaeda threat was heavily stressed but there were no 
discussions of either terrorist Internet use or an American jihadist trend.94  The National 
Intelligence Council’s “Global Trends 2015” publication, released in December 2000, did 
indicate however that the former was still a broad area of concern for the IC as a whole.95  
How to address that issue was still not defined.  
In 2005, the FBI’s counterterrorism division released a comprehensive 3-year 
review (2002 through 2005) of U.S. terrorism incidents and future challenges.  Citing a 
number of foiled jihadist plots involving U.S. citizens and the successful London transit-
system bombing, the FBI report posed that “the lack of strong ties between them [the 
terrorists] and an international terrorist group illustrate the potential threat of 
‘homegrown’ terrorists as perpetrators of future attacks.”96  This was one of the first 
instances in an official assessment of the term homegrown, used to describe jihadist 
perpetrators of Western origin.  Furthermore, it marked a turning point in the scope of 
future assessments from the greater intelligence and counterterrorism communities.   
It should be noted that during this same time period the 9/11 Commission 
published the findings of its investigation and proposals for reform.  Following the 
Commission’s recommendations, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 
of 2004 was instituted, creating an Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) 
with the DNI as the head of the Intelligence Community.97  In October 2005, the ODNI 
published its first National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America, which 
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outlined a series of “mission” and “enterprise” objectives.  Notably, Mission Objective 1 
emphasized identifying, disrupting, and destroying terrorists abroad and “within U.S. 
borders” through a variety of means to include communications channels.98  Mission 
Objective 4 asserted that new methodologies and better use of open sources would be 
needed to penetrate some of America’s adversaries, like terrorists, who may be of 
“amorphous groups or networks that may share common goals, training, and methods, 
but…operate independently.”99  Under Enterprise Objective 1, the existence of 
“ubiquitous communications technology…and extremists with the resources and intent to 
harm Americans” demanded U.S. intelligence to “re-think the way we conduct 
intelligence at home.”100  While not stated explicitly, these strategic objectives set forth 
by the IC’s leading body hinted that, among terrorists, homegrown actors were 
considered viable threats.  The prospect of targeting their use of communications 
technologies warranted greater attention.  These claims were clarified when, in the 
summer of 2006, a report was submitted by the U.S. House Permanent Select Committee 
on Intelligence, declaring a linkage between the Internet and homegrown threats in 
Europe.101  The committee warned that the United States was not immune from the 
homegrown models employed elsewhere in the West.102  Furthermore, it asserted that 
jihadist use of the Internet posed “new challenges for the Intelligence Community and 
law enforcement officials.”103 
In 2007, the ODNI released a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) outlining key 
judgments of the terrorist threat to the U.S. homeland.  Explicitly stated in the first page 
of the document, “NIEs are the DNI's most authoritative written judgments concerning 
national security issues. They contain the coordinated judgments of the Intelligence 
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Community regarding the likely course of future events.”  One of these key judgments 
claimed that the number of radical Internet sites and self-generating cells in Western 
countries, to include the U.S., was expected to increase.104  The estimate continued on to 
say that the spread of extremist ideology in both virtual and physical form “points to the 
possibility that others may become sufficiently radicalized that they will view the use of 
violence here as legitimate.”105  A report published that same year by the Future of 
Terrorism Task Force from the Homeland Security Advisory Council echoed the NIE 
assessment.106  The task force strongly asserted that countering homegrown 
radicalization, in all of its forums, must be a top priority for the Department of Homeland 
Security.107  Tools, methods, and metrics were needed to develop an early warning 
system for law enforcement and to produce intelligence that identifies emerging 
homegrown terrorism trends.108 
D. NOT A TOOL JUST FOR JIHADISTS 
Since the release of the 2007 NIE, statements and publications from the IC and 
law enforcement have only solidified the resolve to counter homegrown jihadism.  
Updated from its 2005 predecessor, the 2009 National Intelligence Strategy explicitly 
states Mission Objective 1 is to “understand, monitor, and disrupt violent extremist 
groups…primarily al-Qaida and its regional affiliates, supporters, and the local terrorist 
cells it inspires…”109  To do so, it must provide warning, disrupt terrorist plans, prevent 
acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, and counter radicalization.110  Achieving 
such a goal requires both innovation and an appreciation of existing capabilities.  
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Although it is understood that the Internet is only one of many possible factors 
contributing to the homegrown jihadist problem, it does appear to be a common enough 
facilitator.  It should be reiterated, of course, that the Internet is not a problem in of itself.  
What makes it remarkable, on the contrary, is the tremendous utility it can provide all users, 
regardless of motive and intent.  In this vein, scholar Gilbert Ramsay’s argument about 
terrorist use of the Internet may have some salience.  However, in line with his assertion of 
exercising government power in the real world, there must be consideration for exercising 
available techniques in a world that is increasingly technology-driven. 
A number of articles, reports, and indictments within the past two years have drawn 
attention to the relevance of open source Internet data and dealing with homegrown jihadists.  
For instance, the FBI and Department of Homeland Security have been following for some 
time the publicly-available online discourse of Anwar al-Awlaki.   The American-born 
radical cleric, who is suspected to now be hiding in Yemen, is considered by many to be a 
prominent instigator of U.S. jihad.111  Awlaki’s violent lectures and rants, distributed via his 
blog site and social networking sites YouTube and Halal Tube, and his connection to Fort 
Hood shooter Major Nidal Hasan, have made him a high value target for authorities.112  
Similarly, the tracking of Philadelphia-woman Colleen LaRose’s social network site activity 
reportedly played a significant role in the foiling of her jihadist plot.  Cases like these reflect 
a response to the concerns that have grown within the research, intelligence and law 
enforcement communities.  The extent to which this response has contributed to disrupting 
homegrown jihad since 9/11 will be investigated in a later chapter, but it can be said that the 
Internet is at the counterterrorists’ disposal.  Notably, a Congressional Research Service 
report on the homegrown threat published during the preparation of this thesis also supports 
this claim.113  While there are a number of challenging issues surrounding the authorities’ use 
of online information, the Internet’s permissive nature keeps it from being a tool just for 
jihadists; it is also a tool for authorities who track jihadists. 
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III. COLLECTING AND USING INTERNET INFORMATION: 
CHALLENGES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
There’s no inherent meaning in information; it’s what we do with that 
information that matters.114 
-Beau Lotto 
The Internet is an essential provider of open source information.  Media that was 
once restricted to print forms, radio, or television is now readily found in digital form that 
can be accessed from anywhere with a computer and Internet connection.  More 
importantly, information can easily be updated and human interaction facilitated in a 
permissive, nearly real-time environment.  However, the Internet is not to be equated 
with the “totality of open sources.”115  While it has grown in importance for intelligence 
operations, “the Internet is in reality a communications medium upon which information 
flows rather than an information repository in its own right.”116  This distinction is 
necessary as it is easy to assume, wrongly, that the Internet provides “one-stop shopping” 
for the most authoritative information a user seeks.  Speeches, radio broadcasts, gray 
literature, and scholarly documents all constitute other forms of open sources that can 
produce meaningful information for authorities.  The advantages gained from Internet 
information should therefore be realized in terms of relative utility to the whole of an 
investigative effort.   
One key benefit of the Internet worth considering is the potential cost savings for 
collection activities.  Clandestine intelligence and undercover law enforcement operations 
are risky and expensive.  Exploiting Internet sources, such as a suspected jihadist-themed 
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blog or social networking site for example, may produce sufficient contextual 
information that eliminates the need to place an agent or officer in harm’s way.  Also, the 
availability of commercial online geospatial tools like Google™ Maps provides a cost-
cutting solution to pricey and controversial imagery technologies.117  What the Internet 
may well provide in the counter-homegrown terrorism role is a public gateway into 
known jihadist operating space, where clues of terrorist activity published by the 
perpetrators themselves can lead authorities to successful intervention.      
Intervention is unlikely to be achieved, however, without careful analysis of 
Internet-derived information.  Analysis determines the information’s significance and 
therefore its applicability to a given user.  While the intricacies of the analytical process 
are beyond the scope of this research, there are related issues that present challenges for 
the use of the Internet as a feasible and acceptable open source tool.  The loftiest is a 
prevailing view that exploiting Internet information is not worth the time and effort.  As 
observed by CIA veteran Ronald Marks, even a recent Director of Central Intelligence 
remarked, “I only have money to pay for secrets,” when asked about leveraging the 
Internet’s vast array of public sources.118  Even if such a view dissipates, there remain a 
number of other obstacles.  The rest of this chapter discusses some of the prominent 
challenges associated with collecting and using Internet information.  It first addresses 
the common problem of information overload and suggests a baseline method for taming 
it.  The second section illuminates the concern over language and cultural skill 
deficiencies among analysts, which can potentially hinder the ability to evaluate 
information.  The third section discusses the challenge of determining the credibility of 
Internet information, drawing on the lessons learned from the research community.  In 
the fourth section, a number of organizations closely involved in counterterrorism are 
presented in order to assess their strengths and suitability in using open source Internet 
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information and to stress the importance of information sharing.  Finally, the discussion 
turns to the controversial topics of protection of American privacy and civil liberty.          
B. DEALING WITH INFORMATION VOLUME 
Best and Cumming observe that one of the greatest obstacles analysts confront in 
exploiting open sources is the enormous volume of information.  They remark that 
“identifying and analyzing information from this data stream can be daunting” for 
analysts.119  The vastness of the Internet only compounds this dilemma.  While queries 
submitted on standard Internet search engines can produce jihadist-related information, 
they are likely to turn out “laundry lists of irrelevant results” and create “information 
overload problems.”120  Some experts argue that such “related but unfocused 
information” complicates any effort to formulate a complete account of jihadist 
activity.121  Therefore the Webmust be filtered to eliminate unrelated or misleading 
information.  Yet the question remains as to what are considered irrelevant results.  
Certainly, a user will be seeking information that is accurate, complete and timely.   
A useful way of addressing the overload problem, as suggested by the NATO 
OSINT guide Intelligence Exploitation of the Internet, is to first establish an Internet 
Collection Plan.122  As with any intelligence operation, collection planning helps in 
keeping collection activities closely tied with the information requirements (in this case, 
the requirement is information indicative of jihadist activity).  The guide outlines four 
steps for constructing an Internet Collection Plan: 
Step 1: Determine Searchable Information Requirements 
Step 2: Determine Best Sites or Search Strategy 
Step 3: Identify the Details to Access or Find Specific Information 
Step 4: Determine Search Time Constraints123 
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Step 1 refers to a process of breaking down an information requirement to more specific 
components that can be reasonably sought after.  For example, a requirement that asks for 
“indications of hostile intent” will likely produce vague results or nothing at all.124  On 
the other hand, a searchable information requirement of “indications of recent weapons or 
explosives training” may yield better, more explicit results.  Step 2 attempts to set an 
analyst on the right path by first starting with known websites that likely contain 
information related to the search.  For instance, a useful starting point may be a visit to 
the interactive website of the New York-based radical Islamic movement ‘Revolution 
Muslim,’ whose goals include establishing Islamic rule in the U.S. and spreading Al 
Qaeda’s word.125  Step 3 ensures that the analyst identifies the details for website access 
(e.g., login ID and password) and key words that may lead the analyst to specific 
information.  Step 4 establishes the time parameters for which site information is to be 
collected.  This final step is important to consider as many online servers “only keep 
information posted for a set amount of time before it is replaced by fresh information.”126  
Based on the format provided by the OSINT guide, a simple example of an Internet 
Collection Plan for homegrown jihad indicators could look like Figure 2:   
Information 
Requirement
Site URL Access Details 
or Key Words









http://www.youtube.com/ Jihad, al Shabab, 
caliphate
Daily updates
http://www.jihadspun.com/    
Figure 2.   Example Internet Collection Plan127 
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Formulating a collection framework of this sort, or with more detail, can help 
with productivity and time efficiency.  If anything, it attempts to focus collection efforts 
and diminish information overload.  Still, more can likely be accomplished with the aid 
of newer, faster technological resources and search engines.  Even organizations 
specialized in information technologies like the Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency found that their Web tools were not tailored for collecting and analyzing terrorist 
Internet information.128  Others in counterterrorism are still confined to essentially ‘doing 
it by hand,’ using conventional search engines for archival and evaluation of jihadist Web 
material.129  
C. LANGUAGE AND CULTURAL OBSTACLES  
Another often-cited challenge that is closely tied to the information filtering 
problem is the deficiency in analyst language and cultural skills.  Such skills aid in 
understanding the context in which information exists and further guide the selection of 
searchable information requirements.  Even if one is able to track down a possible 
jihadist forum, an inability to interpret dialogue in a foreign language can mask critical 
leads or may sway the analyst to dismiss the source outright.  In the case of homegrown 
jihadism, this may be of lesser concern considering the presence of more English-based 
sites.  Still, a keen awareness of vulnerable groups within America’s multicultural 
environment and those immigrant communities that may be attracted to these forums can 
focus collection and prevent analysis turning into broad-based opinion. 
Most of the criticism regarding the lack of these important skills points to a 
greater organizational problem that places minimal emphasis on language proficiencies.  
Stephen Mercado of the CIA’s Directorate of Science and Technology complains that the 
Intelligence Community “suffers from America’s general indifference to foreign 
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languages and ideas.”130  Because few Americans pursue secondary languages through 
the undergraduate level, the Intelligence Community finds itself recruiting from a small 
pool of language and cultural experts.131  Once hired, these new officers still require 
extensive training and job exposure before their skills can provide the needed impact.132  
The Foreign Broadcast Information Service, which is now folded under the National 
Open Source Center, has long been praised as the model for open source translation 
services, drawing upon foreign national and contract employees; however, it too suffers 
from the same personnel limitations.133  Sophisticated translation tools are in 
development134 to supplement the deficiency in actual human translators, but it is likely 
too early to discern whether they can, or should be, deemed effective replacements.    
D. ASSESSING CREDIBILITY 
If analysts are able to filter the overwhelming volume of information and translate 
discourse when necessary, they still face the ultimate challenge of determining the 
credibility of Internet information.  Credibility, in essence, means the information’s 
believability.135  The limitless and generally unregulated nature of the Internet enables 
almost any person to author content and distribute it online.  Miriam Metzger of the 
University of California’s Department of Communication elaborates further: 
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This obviously raises issues of credibility, a problem that is exacerbated 
by the fact that many websites operate without much oversight or editorial 
review.  Unlike most traditional (i.e., print) publishing, information posted 
on the Web may not be subject to filtering through professional 
gatekeepers, and it often lacks traditional authority indicators such as 
author identity or established reputation.136 
Reasonably, such freedom increases the possibility that information presented online may 
be skewed, incomplete, remiss of facts, or manipulated in a manner as to be misleading.  
It is therefore not difficult to see how an analyst could easily be led astray.   
This same difficulty in judging online information has long been a predicament 
for the academic community.  Whereas conventional vetting of print sources like books, 
magazines and journal articles involve rigorous peer review and a recognized editorial 
process, little quality control exists for Internet sources scholars may be inclined to 
use.137  As a result, efforts have been made to identify and promote the skills needed for 
evaluating online information.      
Not surprisingly, research has shown that the skills best suited for assessing 
online information are essentially the same as those for assessing information transmitted 
in other forms of communication.138  This seems sensible, as people were invariably 
faced with having to determine information credibility with the advent of print sources, 
the radio, and then television.  Based on the literature, credibility evaluations of Internet 
information are often recommended to follow five criteria: accuracy, authority, 
objectivity, currency, and coverage.  Metzger explains that accuracy measures the extent 
online information is free from errors and whether the information is both reliable and 
verifiable offline.  Authority may be based upon author credentials, qualifications, 
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affiliations, and external recommendations.  Objectivity requires discernment of a 
website’s purpose, or slant, which may be represented by the nature of facts and opinions 
presented and the types of sponsored or recommended links found on the site.  Currency 
asks whether or not information is up to date (which may be simply represented by a 
date-time stamp).  Finally, coverage assesses comprehensiveness of Internet 
information.139   
For academics, meticulously following such criteria can help avoid compromise 
of their work by untested claims or opinions.  For analysts assessing extremist content, 
however, these rules may not apply so rigidly.  Indeed, bold claims and opinions might 
contain the indicators of violent intent analysts seek.  Typographical errors on an open 
forum bear less consequence in comparison to the consistency and reliability of the 
information transmitted.  
A beneficial characteristic of the Internet is that multiple online sources can be 
gathered rapidly and compared to help assess credibility.  Furthermore, the use of 
cognitive analytic tools that measure clustering around certain topics of discussion can 
assist in identifying highly influential, and therefore meaningful, information streams.140  
Nonetheless, effective credibility assessments of online information are contingent upon 
a synchronous approach that leverages technological analysis with trained human 
expertise.       
E. ORGANIZATIONS 
Following the 9/11 Commission, the intelligence and law enforcement 
communities were charged with paying greater attention to terrorist threats to the 
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homeland emanating from within or from abroad.  This also spurred the creation of new 
organizations and sub-organizations that were chartered to develop and fully implement 
advanced techniques to identify and assess terrorist threats.  Additionally, these 
organizations were intended to establish an improved information sharing environment 
among federal, state, and local entities.141  Private initiatives, to include federally-
supported university projects that specialize in Internet analyses, also joined the 
counterterrorism effort.  Indeed, many of these organizations possess incredible 
capabilities and resources to address the complicated threat of homegrown jihadist 
terrorism.  Some agency-specific limitations, however, raise the question as to which 
entities are suited for collecting and assessing open source Internet information that may 
aid in confronting that threat.  This places greater emphasis on integration and the 
necessity for improved sharing across organizations.    
1. National Counterterrorism Center 
The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) was specifically “established in 
2004 to ensure that information from any source about potential terrorist acts against the 
U.S. could be made available to analysts and that appropriate responses could be 
planned.”142  More explicitly stated in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention 
Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458), the center’s principal mission includes serving as “the 
primary organization in the United States Government for analyzing and integrating all 
intelligence possessed or acquired by the United States Government pertaining to 
terrorism and counterterrorism, excepting intelligence pertaining exclusively to domestic 
terrorists and domestic counterterrorism.”143   
The NCTC is seen as the central organization that breaks down the so-called 
“wall” between intelligence and law enforcement, serving as an all-source fusion center 
for both communities.  As the hub for intelligence integration and dissemination, NCTC 
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is expected to take full advantage of data mining, analytical technologies, and all 
counterterrorism-related intelligence drawn from the wide range of agencies and private 
sector entities.144  Because the specific technical capabilities and practices of NCTC are 
not publicly available, it is difficult to comment as to what extent the center exploits open 
source Internet information.  While it is understood that NCTC monitors the traffic and 
other activities of foreign terrorists and their supporters, the exceptions of domestic 
terrorism and counterterrorism as stated in P.L. 108-458 raise the question as to whether 
or not the agency can be intimately involved with the issue of homegrown jihad.  There is 
a clause that states the center may receive and disseminate intelligence from any federal, 
state, local or other source as consistent with applicable law, but details of under what 
conditions are not specified.145   
Richard Best points out that the circumstances surrounding the Fort Hood Army 
Installation attack carried out by Major Nidal Hasan may reflect NCTC’s limitations.  
Because Hasan was a U.S. citizen and a commissioned officer, information regarding his 
electronic communications and his intentions were likely not to come to the direct 
attention of NCTC.  Details of the center’s involvement will perhaps become clearer as 
the investigation continues.146  It does seem, however, that NCTC has exhibited more of 
a role as facilitator among other agencies dealing directly with the homegrown threat.  
Espousing a “whole of government” approach, director Michael Leiter states that NCTC 
has worked closely with national security agencies such as DHS and the FBI to counter 
domestic radicalization in local communities and over the Internet.147  This could also be 
due to the fact that NCTC is not a large collection agency nor does it have grasp of a 
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sizable budget in comparison to the rest of the IC.148  These possible deficiencies and a 
broadly defined mission challenge the center’s full engagement of the homegrown 
problem. 
2. DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis 
In July 2005, also in response to the mandates of P.L. 108-458 and the additional 
requirements from the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 
2007, the Department of Homeland Security established the Office of Intelligence and 
Analysis (I&A) to serve as the link between the department, the IC, and state, local, and 
private sector partners.149  As another intelligence fusion initiative, I&A’s mission is to 
optimize the DHS information collection and analysis capability for distribution of timely 
and actionable intelligence to a wide range of customers, while respecting American civil 
liberties and privacy.150   
Mark Randol discusses that because DHS does not engage in foreign intelligence 
collection (e.g., imagery intelligence, human intelligence, foreign open source 
intelligence, etc.), the I&A instead combines that information as provided by other 
elements in the IC with the information collected by DHS components.  For example, 
information from local law enforcement, the private sector, domestic open sources, and 
research on violent radicalization may be fused with relevant foreign information to 
produce intelligence products for a variety of users.151  
While details of organic collection activities are unclear, it does seem that I&A 
embraces its role as the sharer of information, producing a number of analytical products, 
                                                 
148 Best, “The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)—Responsibilities and Potential 
Congressional Concerns,” 8; Chris Strohm, “Director: NCTC has Analyst Shortage,” Government 
Executive website, http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0110/012710cdpm2.htm (accessed October 13, 
2010). 
149 Mark A. Randol, “The Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise: Operational 
Overview and Oversight Challenges for Congress,” Congressional Research Service Report R40602, 
March 19, 2010, 2.   
150 Department of Homeland Security, “Office of Intelligence and Analysis,” 
http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/gc_1220886590914.shtm (accessed October 13, 2010). 
151 Randol, “The Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise: Operational Overview 
and Oversight Challenges for Congress,” 5. 
 42
both classified and unclassified, that cover domestic and foreign terrorist threats.152  In 
addressing homegrown jihadism, however, the office focuses on a perspective separate 
from actual extremist activities.  As stated on I&A’s webpage: 
Our top priority is radicalized Islam (Sunni and Shia groups), but we also 
look at radicalized domestic groups. We do not monitor known extremists 
and their activities; instead, we are interested in the radicalization 
process—why and how people who are attracted to radical beliefs cross 
the line into violence.153 
This statement, at first glance, would seem to make clear that I&A does not engage in 
monitoring activities, such as Internet monitoring.  Yet, as read, one may reasonably offer 
that the process of understanding the why and how of homegrown radicalization could 
invariably lead I&A to evaluate Internet sources that DHS and other agencies have 
repeatedly recognized as jihadist facilitators.  Furthermore, although not widely 
publicized, other DHS initiatives have specifically involved the monitoring of publicly-
viewable sites for more general purposes.  Leading up to the January 2009 presidential 
inauguration of Barack Obama, DHS operated a Social Networking Monitoring Center 
(SNMC) that collected on “items of interest” from sites like Facebook, Twitter, and 
YouTube to provide “enhanced situational awareness” to the DHS National Operations 
Center.  The department stressed an adherence to the Fair Information Practice 
Principles154 to guard against privacy infringements and the collection of Personally 
Identifiable Information (PII), which was in line with the DHS mission statement.  But it 
was also made clear that in assessing situational awareness, they were also scanning for 
indicators of “life or death incidents” and “natural or man-made disasters.”155   
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Online information collected via centers like the SNMC is likely to pass through 
the I&A if the office is as integrated as DHS claims it to be.  Whether such information is 
thoroughly analyzed for indications of jihadist activity is still questionable.  The I&A’s 
ability to provide quality service to State and local authorities, who are often seen as the 
“first preventers” of terrorism,156 will rest upon its capability to receive and evaluate 
information that is acquired by emerging collection methods as exhibited by the SNMC.  
3. National Open Source Center 
The National Open Source Center (NOSC) was established by the DNI in 
November 2005 as the bedrock of what has been labeled the Open Source Enterprise.  As 
identified earlier, increased leverage of open source information was emphasized after the 
release of the 9/11 Commission Report and the signing of the Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.  The NOSC, which resides at the CIA, builds upon the 
former Foreign Broadcast Information Service which has long held distinction for its 
foreign open source exploitation capability.  As such, it is uniquely proficient in 
providing translations and analysis of a wide range of open source information for a 
number of agencies. 
As stated in Intelligence Community Directive 301, “the Center serves to advance 
the IC’s exploitation of open source material and nurtures acquisition, procurement, 
analysis, dissemination, and sharing of open source information, products, and services 
throughout the USG.”157  Although the NOSC would appear to be the principal 
organization for collecting and assessing open source Internet information to counter the 
homegrown threat, it does have limitation.  Because it currently falls under the 
administrative control of the CIA, the NOSC is constrained in providing adequate support 
to law enforcement agencies and state, local, and tribal entities.”158  The National 
Security Act’s statutory prohibition of CIA participation in law enforcement activities 
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essentially bars the NOSC from collecting information directly on activities within the 
United States.159  As a result, organizations like the DHS Office of Intelligence and 
Analysis have in the interim relied on the NOSC more for technical support and training.   
4. Federal Bureau of Investigation 
The FBI has both been praised and harshly criticized for its broad range of 
activities with the Internet.  Recognized for its successes in countering cyber fraud, cyber 
crime, and online predators, the FBI’s counterterrorism efforts using the Internet have 
generally not been well received.  This is predominantly due to the revelation in 2000 of 
the bureau’s software program known as Carnivore that could be installed in Internet 
Service Provider equipment to intercept private e-mails and track user Web activity.  
Consequently, this raised the heated issue of possible privacy infringement of innocent 
Internet users.160  A key distinction to be made here is that Carnivore enabled the FBI to 
essentially conduct electronic eavesdropping (versus open source collection), which is 
prohibited under Title III of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act.161 
Legislative reform has provided improved governance and oversight of 
wiretapping and electronic surveillance while still allowing the FBI to confront a host of 
cyber-related threats.  The bureau’s Cyber Division, for example, claims to be tailored to 
address domestic cyber threats and the pursuance of the perpetrators.162  However, 
according to the division’s director Gordon Snow the primary thrust of the Cyber 
Division is to track down criminals or terrorists who attempt to conduct computer 
network penetrations and attacks.163  Snow remarks that “the first cyber threat is terrorist 
groups and organizations using cyber as a means for recruitment, radicalization and 
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communication,” but “the threat we mine down on here in the Cyber Division is them 
using their capabilities and tools as a point or vector to do damage to critical 
infrastructure or systems within the United States.”164  While the division seeks to 
identify domestic terrorists, it seems that this program within the FBI places less 
emphasis on what Snow identifies as the first threat.  Another FBI initiative, however, 
may be filling that void. 
An advanced electronic surveillance program known as the “Going Dark” 
program was budgeted $233.9 million for 2010.165  The FBI has stated that the program’s 
purpose is to exploit changing technology and Inernet-Based capabilities and to conduct 
automated analysis of surveillance subjects.166  Whether this program specifically 
involves open source monitoring is not yet known.  Since the public release of the 
program, however, there have been recent reports of suspected homegrown jihadist 
incidents that involved the FBI monitoring public websites and blogs prior to advancing 
investigations.167  
5. University of Arizona Dark Web Project 
In 2002, a team of terrorism researchers and computer scientists came together at 
the University of Arizona’s Artificial Intelligence Laboratory to devise a new way of 
obtaining and analyzing terrorism on the Internet.  They defined their research 
environment as the “Dark Web,” referencing “the portion of the World Wide Web used 
to help achieve the sinister objectives of terrorists and extremists.”168  
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The team had observed that advanced Web data mining technologies had been 
widely used in business and scientific research.  Yet to their knowledge no such approach 
had been applied to collect and analyze terrorist information on the Internet.169  As a 
result, they devised a semi-automated system that methodically collects jihadist-related 
information, filters it, and then analyzes it.  Using a collection technique called 
“spidering,” the system is able to harvest extremist websites, forum threads, and 
multimedia files such as images, audio, and video clips.170  More impressively, the 
system collects and processes forum contents in Arabic, English, Spanish, French and 
Chinese.171 
The Dark Web system is designed to reduce the challenges faced by researchers 
and information managers in collecting and analyzing multilingual information generated 
by terrorists and their sympathizers.172  Furthermore, the system relies totally on open 
source information.  Unlike some of the controversial NSA and FBI programs, the Dark 
Web project is not supposed to be a secretive interception tool.  Rather, it is a targeted 
retrieval system that searches for specific terrorist indicators posted on the public web.  
Because America now faces a homegrown jihadist threat that also makes use of the 
Internet, open source systems like the Dark Web project may be particularly useful in 
early identification.  This capability may provide a feasible solution to the current 
statutory prohibition limiting the NOSC and serve as a model for ongoing efforts within 
the FBI and DHS in focusing scope and protecting individual privacy.    
F. PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 
As alluded to throughout this research, the protection of American privacy and 
civil liberties is a highly contentious issue and arguably presents one of the more 
daunting challenges of those discussed thus far.  In the wake of 9/11, Congress passed the 
United and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept 
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and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act, P.L. 107-56, thereby increasing the ability 
for law enforcement and other government entities to intercept computer 
communications.  In particular, e-mail sender and addressee information (not message 
content) and website visits could be captured by way of trap and trace devices attached to 
Internet service equipment.173  According to Marcia Smith et al., the debate about law 
enforcement monitoring Internet activity was not a highly visible issue leading up to the 
September 11, 2001 attacks.174  This was due in part to the congressional mandate that a 
court order must first be issued before surveillance could take place.  Furthermore, many 
citizens were more concerned at the time on consumer privacy issues; that is to say, “the 
collection, use, and dissemination of personally identifiable information by commercial 
website operators” without the consent of the owners.175  The authorization of the USA 
PATRIOT Act, however, quickly shifted concerns about commercial misuse to the more 
unnerving possibility of government abuse of personal information. 
Section 212 of the USA PATRIOT Act stirred some of the greatest controversy, 
as it authorized ISPs to act without customer consent prior to disclosing personal 
information.     
Section 212 allows ISPs to divulge records or other information (but not 
the contents of communications) pertaining to a subscriber if they believe 
there is immediate danger of death or serious physical injury or as 
otherwise authorized, and requires them to divulge such records or 
information (excluding contents of communications) to a governmental 
entity under certain conditions. It also allows an ISP to divulge the 
contents of communications to a law enforcement agency if it reasonably 
believes that an emergency involving immediate danger of death or 
serious physical injury requires disclosure of the information without 
delay.176 
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Although Section 212 was subject to sunset, Congress was able to subsume and further 
expand the section’s authorizations in Section 225 of the Homeland Security Act (P.L. 
107-296).  Congress amended the original clause to lower the threshold in which ISPs 
could disclose information and to whom they could divulge in.  Instead of requiring a 
“reasonable belief,” ISPs only needed a “good faith” belief of a life-threatening danger.  
Nor did the danger need to be “immediate.”177   Section 225 also allowed ISPs to 
voluntarily divulge private communications to federal, state, or local government 
agencies instead of just a “law enforcement agency” as originally stated in Section 212 of 
the USA PATRIOT Act.178  
The perception of privacy infringement predictably weighs heavily on any future 
developments in technology-based surveillance.  Even the use of open source information 
that is drawn from online public forums carries the risk of inadvertent collection of 
personally identifiable information.  Such risk can result in significant backlash by the 
American public if not handled with care.  While any range of measures still may not 
appease the most ardent of privacy advocates, there have been policies put forth by 
Congress and government agencies to uphold the right to privacy yet still allow sufficient 
leeway, in their view, to protect the public from harm.  DHS, for example, published in 
December 2008 a Privacy Policy Guidance Memorandum that explicitly states the 
department’s adherence to the Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs), a set of 
principles that form the framework of the Privacy Act of 1974.  The FIPPs govern the 
department’s use of personally identifiable information, requiring transparency, purpose 
specificity, and data minimization to ensure individual privacy is maintained.179  More 
recently, DHS disseminated a Privacy Impact Assessment statement in June 2010 that 
describes the department’s new publicly available social media monitoring initiative and 
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outlines the measures in place to safeguard personal information.180  These types of 
policies help to improve the transparency of government activities on the Internet.  
Greater secrecy on the other hand, especially in relation to domestic affairs, is likely only 
to result in greater recoil.   
Transparency through public announcements is only half of the solution, however.  
The other half rests on the government’s ability to prove that the methods it employs are 
also not an infringement on First Amendment rights.  Public opinion, to include dissent, 
is protected, and Internet venues arguably support that constitutional right.  
Consequently, the challenge for authorities in using publicly available Internet discourse 
is “successfully proving criminal intent to incite” or carry out violent jihadist attacks.181  
According to Siobhan O’Neil, authorities have had some success in this arena when 
dealing with other domestic extremist groups that operate online.182  A recent case 
involving a self-proclaimed jihadist from Virginia, who reportedly posted violent threats 
online and provided material support to known terrorists, also displays the capacity for 
success against homegrown jihad.183  
The implication for policymakers therefore is one that has been stressed time and 
again.  Policymakers, and the policy enforcers, must strive for a balance in protecting 
American society through as many means as available while still upholding the 
fundamental rights of its citizenry.  Increasing awareness of government activities over 
the open Internet (and the governing laws and regulations of those activities) is essential, 
as is spreading the knowledge that such methods can potentially aid in countering 
homegrown terrorist activity.     
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Figure 3.   Case Study Map 
This chapter presents a series of case studies of homegrown jihadist incidents that 
occurred across the nation since 9/11, providing a description of the plotters involved, a 
synopsis of each incident, and detailed evaluations of the investigations.  Figure 3 above 
provides a snapshot of those cases.  The analysis of each incident followed the construct 
that was discussed in Chapter I, with the purpose of providing a qualitative understanding 
of detection techniques and the contribution by open source Internet exploitation.  Using 
available legal documents and media reports, potential indicators were classified under 
these general categories: interpersonal; Inernet-Based; incident reports and watchlist 
alerts; documents, media, and material; or confidential.  Each category was then 
appraised at length using the following queries: 
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• Was the information “good enough” at the time of discovery, therefore allowing 
timely intervention? 
• Did the information provide, in context, “good enough” understanding to move 
forward with investigation or intervention? 
• Was the information shared in order to attract other useful information?    
The first question sought to determine if reported or discovered indicators were 
immediately telling of a possible jihadist plot and allowed for authorities to intervene or 
initiate the investigative process.  The second question, though seemingly redundant, 
sought to answer whether certain indicators provided contextual knowledge of jihadist 
activity that assisted in furthering the investigation or intervention.  The third question 
attempted to capture instances of information sharing not only among government 
agencies, but also from the private and community sectors.  An assessment was then 
provided for each case to elucidate the success, shortcomings, or non-applicability of 
open source Internet exploitation.  Figure 4 is an overview of the profile for each case 











Portland Seven X X X X
Torrance Plotters X X X X
Adam Gadahn X X X X
Ronald Grecula X X X
Najibullah Zazi X X X X X
Michael Finton X X X X X
Hosam Smadi X X X X X
Georgia Plotters X X X X X
Toledo Three X X X X X
Colleen LaRose X X X X  
Figure 4.     Overview of Indicators for Selected Studies 
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B. PORTLAND SEVEN—PORTLAND, OR (2002) 
Habis Abdulla al Saoub.  A Jordanian native, Al Saoub had served as a former 
mujahedeen during the Soviet-Afghanistan conflict.  He was considered the de facto 
leader of the Portland cell, providing the political justification for the group’s endeavors. 
Jeffrey Leon Battle.  A U.S. national originally from Houston, Texas, Battle moved to 
Portland after washing out of U.S. Army boot camp.  
October Martinique Lewis.  Lewis, a convert to Islam and Battle’s ex-wife, joined the 
cell when she too moved to Portland from Houston. 
Patrice Lumumba Ford.  An Islamic convert raised in Portland, Ford was once held in 
high esteem at the Portland City Hall where he served twice as an intern.  He was 
introduced to the cell through the Masjid as-Saber mosque.  
Maher Hawash.  A naturalized citizen originally from Palestine, Hawash was a 
respected software engineer for Intel.  He returned to the Islamic faith after the death of 
his father in 2000, but subsequently joined the extremist cell while attending the Masjid 
as-Saber mosque. 
Ahmed Ibrahim Bilal and Muhammad Ibrahim Bilal.  Little background information 
is available, but the two U.S.-born brothers were also reportedly recruited through 
mosque affiliations.184 
Summary.  In October 2002, five members of the Portland-based group were arrested by 
the FBI for attempting to travel to Afghanistan and join the Taliban in fighting the U.S. 
military.  Maher Hawash, was arrested a year later in connection to the conspiracy, and 
the seventh member, al Saoub, was reportedly killed in Afghanistan by Pakistani 
forces.185  During the course of their plot, members conducted firearms training, provided 
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funding, conspired to attack Jewish establishments, and attempted to enter Afghanistan 
multiple times by way of China and Pakistan.186 
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Figure 5.   Portland Seven Indicators 
1.  Was the information “good enough” at the time of discovery, therefore allowing 
timely intervention? 
Inernet-Based 
Yes. By the time the FBI had chosen to conduct surveillance of e-mails under the 
USA PATRIOT Act, authorities already had suspicion that there were a number of 
individuals involved in a conspiracy to enter Afghanistan.187  Authorities scrutinized 
hundreds of e-mail exchanges between Battle and his partners and confirmed identities of 
the other six cell members.188     
Incident Reports 
No. On September, 29, 2001, a Sheriff’s Deputy from Skamania County, 
Washington was dispatched to a gravel pit after receiving a report of men shooting 
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police incident report, identifying the names of all involved.  The deputy was unaware 
that the conspirators were training to fight American forces abroad and sent them on their 
way without further dispute.189   
Documents 
Unknown. According to the October 2002 indictment, al Saoub discarded a bag 
containing a cancelled Jordanian passport and a ‘Martyr’s will’ addressed to the 
Mujahideen leader Mohammad Ibin Abdallah.190  The bag was reportedly fished out of 
the recycling bin at his apartment by a neighbor who then turned it into the FBI.191  
Although the information would prove useful in the case later on, it is not clear if it was a 
sufficient indicator at the time to allow intervention of the plot.  
Confidential Sources 
Yes. The FBI placed a confidential informant in the mosque attended by the 
group.  He in turn befriended Battle, allowing him to secretly record a number of 
conversations revealing the group’s intentions to attack local Jewish synagogues and the 
plan to go to Afghanistan.  While investigators could have moved on Battle at that time, 
they chose to continue monitoring with the intent of capturing the rest of the cell.192   
2.  Did the information provide, in context, “good enough” understanding to move 
forward with investigation or intervention? 
Inernet-Based 
Yes. According to Assistant U.S. Attorney Charles Gorder, a prosecutor in the 
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investigators had gathered on the cell members.  The FBI was able to track instructions 
and money transfers, thereby enabling the bureau to build the case for conspiracy to 
provide material support to terrorists.193  
Incident Reports 
Yes. The Sheriff’s Deputy may not have picked up on a jihadist conspiracy at the 
time, but his report did catch the attention of his boss who recognized the name of a 
wanted individual he saw on the news.  The deputy’s report later served as evidence of 
the jihadist cell’s training.194     
Documents 
Yes. Though the discarded passport and will did not enable early intervention, the 
documents did later support the investigation.  As found in the indictment, they were 
considered as part of a number of specific overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy to 
wage jihad.195  
Confidential Sources 
Yes. The information from the informant did indeed provide “good enough” 
understanding of jihadist plotting to move forward with investigation.  As noted earlier, 
Battle openly admitted to the informant that the group considered attacking Jewish 
establishments.  According to the Department of Justice, “this gave prosecutors the 
confidence not to arrest Battle prematurely while they continued to gather evidence on 
the other members of the cell.”196  The FBI was then able to attain clearance to conduct 
wiretaps of the other members.  The information gained by these undercover sources, 
supported by e-mail exchanges, allowed authorities to arrest the entire group (instead of 
just Battle) prior to executing any sort of domestic attack.197  
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3.  Was the information shared in order to attract other useful information? 
Inernet-Based 
Unknown. Available reporting does not indicate whether or not intercepted e-
mail information was shared outside of the FBI. 
Incident Reports 
Yes. Upon processing the police report, the Skamania County Sheriff’s Office 
identified one of the shooters as a convicted felon in Oregon, and in turn passed the 
report to the Portland FBI office.198  The report helped open the investigation that would 
lead to the discovery of the jihadist cell. 
Documents 
Yes. An alert and apparently suspicious neighbor turned over the documents to 
the FBI. 
Confidential Sources 
Yes. It was an Oregon state trooper, who learned of the investigation through the 
Portland Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) who first developed the confidential 
informant within the local Muslim community.199   
Assessment.  In the case of the Portland Seven, open source Internet information did not 
contribute to the investigation.  Rather, a combination of other indicators helped discover 
this case of homegrown jihadism.  While the firearms incident report may be seen as the 
most important catalyst, it may have yielded nothing at all had not the Skamania County 
Sheriff’s Office passed along the information.  Successful maneuvering of a confidential 
informant and interceptions of communications under the USA PATRIOT Act 
contributed the most in directly uncovering the conspiracy.  The reporting of the 
suspicious documents by a wary neighbor helped confirm the group’s intent.  In this 
instance, overall success was achieved through proactive information sharing by local 
law enforcement and coordination between partner agencies. 
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C. TORRANCE PLOTTERS—TORRANCE, CA (2005) 
Kevin James. Considered the leader of the cell, James founded the Jam’iyyat Ul-Islam 
Is-Saheeh group while in prison. 
Levar Washington. Washington was recruited by James while also serving as an inmate.  
Upon release, he took guidance from James who orchestrated the group’s plot from 
prison. 
Gregory Patterson. An employee at the Los Angeles Airport, Patterson was recruited by 
Washington while attending the Jamaat-E-Masijudal mosque.  
Hammad Samana. Samana was a U.S. resident originally from Pakistan and a student at 
Santa Monica College.  He too was recruited by Washington while at the Jamaat-E-
Masijudal mosque. 
Summary.  In August 2005, the members of the homegrown group known as Jam’iyyat 
Ul-Islam Is-Saheeh (JIS) were charged with conspiracy to levy war against the U.S. 
through terrorism.  They plotted to attack Los Angeles-area military facilities, Jewish 
establishments, and the Los Angeles International Airport.  James, who was incarcerated, 
directed from prison the other members of the cell to conduct training, reconnoiter 
targets, and finance their jihadist operation through armed robberies.200   
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Figure 6.     Torrance Plotters Indicators  
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1.  Was the information “good enough” at the time of discovery, therefore allowing 
timely intervention? 
Inernet-Based 
No. After their arrest, Patterson and Samana admitted to using the Internet on 
home computers to research U.S. military, Israeli government, and Jewish targets that 
were listed on the cell’s handwritten “Modes of Attack” document.  Validation of these 
claims was subsequently conducted after the computers had been seized and exploited by 
authorities.201  The information was certainly good enough to support the case.  However, 
because it was not discovered until after the suspects had been apprehended, the 
information contributed little to an early intervention of the plot. 
Incident Reports 
No. The cell conducted a string of gas station robberies throughout southern 
California to fund their terrorist plans.202  However, police response was criminally-
focused, and reasonably so—nothing from any of the robberies roused suspicion of 
potential terrorism. 
Documents, Media, Material 
Yes. The subsequent search of the residence shared by Washington and Patterson 
revealed the JIS “Modes of Attack” document, which identified the group’s proposed 
targets.  In addition to this document were found military-style equipment and a Usama 
Bin Laden poster.203  One of the police officers, who had been trained to identify 
potential signs of radicalism, deemed the discovery significant enough to report it to the 
Los Angeles JTTF.  The task force went to work immediately.204 
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Confidential Sources 
No. Police discovered a cell phone that had been dropped at one of the robbed gas 
stations and were able to trace it back to Patterson.  There were no indications of jihadist 
activity, but the evidence as related to the criminal incident was significant enough for 
the authorities to locate Patterson’s residence and place him under surveillance in the 
hope of catching him in a criminal act.205 
2.  Did the information provide, in context, “good enough” understanding to move 
forward with investigation or intervention? 
Inernet-Based 
Yes. The Internet history information, though discovered after the apprehension 
of the suspects, was good enough to support the existence of a jihadist conspiracy.  
Authorities were able to use this information to demonstrate the JIS intent to attack the 
targets listed on the “Modes of Attack” document.206   
Incident Reports 
No. Given the string of robberies and limited information available, Southern 
California police believed they had strictly a criminal case on their hands.  Police 
remained unaware even after the discovery of Patterson’s cell phone at a crime scene.   
Documents, Media, Material 
Yes. The “Modes of Attack” document seized during the apartment search clearly 
stated “Military Targets” and listed known military offices in the Los Angeles area.  The 
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targets identified, the confiscation of military-style equipment, and the presence of 
jihadist propaganda at the household, the JTTF was more than compelled to move 
forward with investigation.208   
Confidential Sources 
No.  In context, the cell phone trace and surveillance were not sufficient 
indicators of jihadist activity.  The police were after gas station robbers.  By actively 
observing Patterson, the police were able to capture him and his associates during a 
criminal act, and subsequently conduct a search of their residence.209 
3.  Was the information shared in order to attract other useful information? 
Inernet-Based 
Unknown. The indictments against the suspects indicate that the information 
found on their computer Internet history was useful to the prosecution.210  However, it is 
not explicitly clear as to what extent the information was shared among partner agencies 
of the JTTF.    
Incident Reports 
Unknown. Available sources do not indicate that the reports of the robberies were 
proactively shared among Los Angeles area police departments or other agencies.  
However, this is not to say that the information was not made available. 
Documents, Media, Material 
Yes. Attorney Thomas P. O’Brien of the Central District of California, the office 
that prosecuted the Torrance case, stated that after the initial notification of the jihadist 
material the JTTF was “up within hours with a command post, and we had at least 25 
agencies and over 500 investigators, analysts and prosecutors at the local, state and 
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military levels.  We seized and analyzed thousands of documents.”211  John J. Neu, Chief 
of Police for the Torrance Police Department, further confirmed that the information 
relating to the seized evidence was widely disseminated among partner agencies in order 
to advance the investigation.  “The vertical sharing of intelligence information, coupled 
with communication and coordination throughout the investigation, proved to be 
invaluable to all of the agencies involved.”212 
Confidential Sources 
No. Sources indicate that information related to the lost cell phone was confined 
to the robbery investigation by the Torrance Police.213   
Assessment.  Of the possible indicators, it was the discovery of the jihadist manifesto and 
related propaganda that alerted authorities to the extremist threat.  Up to that point, law 
enforcement admittedly believed they were dealing with money-driven criminals.  
Neither the police reports nor the subsequent undercover work were in response to a 
jihadist plot; the latter did, however, prove lucky for the authorities.  While Internet 
information did prove useful later in the investigation, it was not discovered in such a 
manner as to prompt an early intervention of the plot.  Furthermore, the information on 
its own would have meant very little without the existence of the other documents or the 
admission by the suspects.  Finally, information sharing played a key role.  The extent of 
sharing is not well known, but the coordinated responses by the Torrance police and the 
JTTF (which is comprised of multiple agencies) after the household search indicate that 
sharing among agencies did occur. 
D. ADAM GADAHN—RIVERSIDE, CA (2004) 
Adam Yahiye Gadahn.  Also known as “Azzam the American” and Abu Suhayb Al-
Amriki, Gadahn is an American citizen who was raised in Riverside, California.  He 
converted to Islam as a teenager and moved to Pakistan in 1998.  He resurfaced in 2004 
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when he appeared in a video broadcast declaring he had joined Al Qaeda, "a movement 
waging war on America and killing large numbers of Americans," and that "the streets of 
America shall run red with blood."214  He is considered to be a leading propagandist, 
translator, and planner of terrorist attacks for Al Qaeda.  
Summary.  In 2006, Gadahn was indicted in the Central District of California for treason 
and material support to Al Qaeda and subsequently added to the FBI’s Most Wanted 
Terrorists List.215  According to the indictment, Gadahn “gave al-Qaeda aid and comfort, 
within the United States and elsewhere, with intent to betray the United States” and “did 
knowingly provide, and aid and abet the provision of, material support and 
resources…including personnel and services, to a foreign terrorist organization, al-
Qaeda.”216  Two years prior to his indictment, Gadahn was listed as a suspected Al Qaeda 
associate who had attended training camps in Afghanistan.217  The first American to be 
charged with treason since World War II, he is still considered a fugitive at large.218  
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Figure 7.     Adam Gadahn Indicators  
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1.  Was the information “good enough” at the time of discovery, therefore allowing 
timely intervention? 
Interpersonal Interaction 
No. Between 1996 and 1997, several of Gadahn’s mosque affiliates from the 
Islamic Society of Orange County noticed a distinct change in his behavior.  In short 
order, he began wearing traditional Muslim garb and joined a small discussion group of 
men who were known to be militant in their religious and political beliefs.  Haitham 
“Danny” Bundakji, a prominent leader from the mosque who served as a witness at 
Gadahn’s conversion to Islam, had a number of confrontations with him and was even 
assaulted by Gadahn after admonishing him.219  Muzammil Siddiqi, the society's religious 
director, recollected that “"He was becoming very extreme in his ideas and views…he 
must have disliked something."220  Despite the behavioral change, assault, and radical 
affiliations, no indications were relayed to authorities that Gadahn was considering jihad.  
Inernet-Based 
Yes. The California native’s online vitriol sufficiently alerted authorities to a 
homegrown jihadist threat.  Following the release of his first videotape in 2004, Gadahn 
appeared numerous times in Internet broadcasts posted on jihadist websites.  In many of 
his early postings, Gadahn wore a scarf and sunglasses to cover his face, but openly 
identified himself under his alias Azzam the American.  On July 7, 2006, he again 
appeared online, this time unmasked, advocating violence against the homeland.  The 
FBI conducted voice analysis of the clips and confirmed that the individual was indeed 
Gadahn.221      
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Incident Reports 
Yes. Few details are known, but the CIA was reportedly alerted to some of 
Gadahn’s peripheral involvement with Al Qaeda during the interrogations of 
apprehended jihadists, Abu Zubaydah and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.222  Though the 
agency did not know Gadahn’s whereabouts, the information was “good enough” at the 
time of discovery to begin tracking of his jihadist activity. 
Media 
Yes. Gadahn first reached a worldwide audience in 2004 when both ABC News 
and FOX News aired a videotape featuring “Azzam the American.”  ABC News had 
attained the tape from a source in Waziristan.  In the video, Gadahn claimed that he 
joined Al Qaeda and promised that the United States would face continued attack.  
Authorities said they could not verify the authenticity of the tape after a “preliminary 
technical analysis” by the CIA, but intelligence officials did confirm the signature 
markings of Al Qaeda’s media arm, Al Sahab, and that the video content was “classic Al 
Qaeda propaganda, in terms of anti-U.S. ideology and denunciation of the U.S.”223      
2.  Did the information provide, in context, “good enough” understanding to move 
forward with investigation or intervention? 
Interpersonal Interaction 
Yes. Although Gadahn’s personal relationships did not trigger early intervention, 
they did later contribute to advancing investigation after his first videotape was released.  
Bundakji reported that he believed it was Gadahn from the gestures and voice (Gadahn’s 
face was covered in his first video).  Gadahn’s aunt also told the FBI that she thought the 
individual was possibly her nephew.224  After Gadahn’s identity was confirmed, Saraah 
Olson, who also attended the same mosque, passed on her recollection of Gadahn’s 
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radicalization and association with other radicals: “Adam turned very, very 
quickly…they would be every day in our living room—Khalil and Hisham—saying, 
‘You have to kill the kufar, the nonbeliever.’”225 
Inernet-Based 
Yes. Gadahn’s online postings, which appeared on obscure or extremist websites, 
were good enough for authorities to pursue the case fervently.  His 2006 releases showed 
him umasked with Osama bin Laden’s top lieutenant, Ayman al-Zawahiri, who endorsed 
Gadahn and introduced him as a “brother.”  Gadahn then proceeded to claim the United 
States as “enemy soil.”226  This information was important “because al-Qaeda’s 
leadership had never before given one of its members such a direct and intimate 
endorsement.”  It also earned Gadahn the count of treason on his indictment.     
Incident Reports 
Yes. Specific mention of Gadahn during interrogations convinced authorities to 
seek further information about his activities.  Khalid Sheikh Mohammed told 
interrogators in 2003 that he had personally asked Gadahn to join him in a plot to blow 
up gas stations in Maryland.227  Soon thereafter, the FBI issued ‘Seeking Information’ 
and ‘Be on the lookout’ (BOLO) notices for Gadahn.228   
Media 
Yes. Though authorities were not able to ascertain the authenticity of the 
videotape immediately, the nature of the content was clear enough.  Authorities were able 
to use the video in their inquiries with Gadahn’s former personal contacts.   
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3.  Was the information shared in order to attract other useful information? 
Interpersonal Interaction 
Yes. After the widespread reporting of Gadahn’s videotape, a number of relatives, 
friends, and former mosque affiliates contributed their stories both to the authorities and 
media.  This enabled the FBI and CIA to understand Gadahn’s early connections to Al 
Qaeda. 
Inernet-Based 
Yes. Gadahn’s Internet postings were made available for all to view.  According 
to available reporting, Gadahn’s first release was analyzed and shared among a number of 
agencies and it is reasonable to say the same occurred for the online videos.  In 2008, for 
example, rumors had spread that Gadahn had been killed in an airstrike.229  Information 
from a newly discovered Internet post, transcribed and disseminated by private open 
source centers, quickly facilitated the FBI and intelligence officials in confirming that the 
claim was false.230    
Incident Reports 
Yes. The information obtained by CIA officials was passed to other agencies.  For 
example, in May 2004, Attorney General John Ashcroft and FBI Director Robert Mueller 
announced during a press conference confirmed that they had obtained the “credible 
intelligence.”231   
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Media 
Yes. ABC News shared the videotape with the CIA, NSA, and FBI for analysis 
prior to airing it to the public. 
Assessment.  All of the indicators, with the exception of interpersonal interactions, were 
“good enough” at the time of discovery to alert law enforcement and intelligence officials 
to a homegrown jihadist threat.  Though none led to Gadahn’s capture, each were critical 
to building a credible case against him and subsequently indicting him for treason and 
material support to terrorists.  Furthermore, open source Internet information played an 
extensive role in this case.  Because the majority of evidence of Gadahn’s allegiance to 
Al Qaeda was substantiated by his public Internet postings, both government analysts and 
private monitors were able to collect and analyze the information free from more 
confidential means.  This also allowed a more permissive setting for the sharing of 
information among all investigators.  While there is little question that it was Gadahn’s 
intent to use the Internet to broadcast his violent intentions widely, this case demonstrates 
that authorities are tracking the material and that it can be used against homegrown 
jihadists in the court of law. 
E. RONALD GRECULA—HOUSTON, TX (2005) 
Ronald Allen Grecula. A 68-year old engineer and resident of Bangor, Pennsylvania at 
the time of his arrest, Grecula already had criminal history with the FBI.  In November 
2000, he abducted his own children without the knowledge of his wife and fled to Malta.  
The FBI issued a warrant for “Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecution.”232  Grecula was 
arrested and subsequently spent time in a Malta prison while awaiting extradition to the 
United States.  His grievances toward the U.S. government apparently began after 
ultimately losing custody of the children to his wife.233 
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Summary.  In May 2005, Grecula was arrested in Houston, Texas and charged with 
“attempting to provide material support and resources to a designated foreign terrorist 
organization, namely Al Qaeda.”234  According to case reports, Grecula negotiated over a 
one-month period with a confidential source and undercover agents a plan to build and 
sell an explosive device to terrorists targeting the United States.235  In exchange for the 
bomb, Grecula requested custody of his children and the assassination of his estranged 





















Figure 8.     Ronald Grecula Indicators  
1.  Was the information “good enough” at the time of discovery, therefore allowing 
timely intervention? 
Incident Reports 
No. Grecula’s prior FBI conviction was for parental kidnapping.  There were no 
signals of terrorist affiliations or motivations at that time. 
Documents and Material 
Yes. According to a detailed FBI criminal complaint, Grecula presented 
documents to an undercover agent (whom he thought was an Al Qaeda associate) 
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describing how he would construct a bomb using hydrogen chloride.  Immediately 
following that meeting, FBI officials executed a search warrant of Grecula’s residence 
and discovered “Lithium Nitrate and a Mercury Switch that could be used to trigger an 
explosive device.”237  The evidence made Grecula’s intentions clear at the time of 
discovery and allowed the FBI to act.     
Confidential Sources 
Yes. Information provided by a combination of confidential sources was good 
enough to prompt the authorities.  While Grecula was in prison in Malta, he befriended 
an individual whom he did not know was a confidential informant for the FBI.  He later 
contacted the informant to ask for assistance in connecting him with Al Qaeda or any 
other terrorist group targeting the U.S.  The informant relayed Grecula’s plans to the 
Houston Division of the FBI in late April 2005, prompting an investigation that relied on 
undercover agents and telephone wiretaps.238   
2.  Did the information provide, in context, “good enough” understanding to move 
forward with investigation or intervention? 
Incident Reports 
Yes. Although Grecula’s prior arrest had little connection with his attempt to aid 
Al Qaeda, some information from a past FBI interview was referenced and proved useful 
to the new investigation.  Grecula told the confidential informant that all of the 
components for his proposed bomb could be purchased at a welding supply store and 
explained that bottles of hydrogen or oxygen could be used for the explosive device.239  
The FBI went back and reviewed a 2002 interview FBI officials had with Grecula and 
saw he stated that he was educated as a mechanical engineer, experimented with 
alternative fuels and energy, and knew how to weld.     
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Documents and Material 
Yes. Grecula brought with him to Houston a suitcase full of information relating 
to his background and his bomb.  As mentioned earlier, he produced this information and 
gave it to an undercover agent during their meeting.  With key evidence in hand, the 
agent was able to press the meeting further, bringing in another undercover agent to 
finalize negotiations with Grecula.240   
Confidential Sources 
Yes. After the confidential informant first alerted the FBI, the agency had the 
informant engage in a number of monitored telephone conversations with Grecula.  The 
FBI was able to collect information on Grecula’s initial bomb design and his plot to fly 
anywhere to meet with an Al Qaeda representative.  An undercover agent posing as an Al 
Qaeda member then contacted Grecula to set up the meeting in Houston, where the FBI 
hoped they would gather sufficient proof to arrest him for attempting to provide material 
support.    
3.  Was the information shared in order to attract other useful information?  
Incident Reports 
Yes. The information from the 2002 FBI interview pertaining to his kidnapping 
charge was shared with the Houston office.  According to Special Agent Lisa Baldwin, 
this allowed Houston officials to corroborate the claims Grecula made to the confidential 
informant about his technical capacity to actually construct a bomb.241   
Documents and Material 
Yes. While it is not clear if the bomb information from Grecula’s meeting in 
Houston was immediately shared with other offices, it is clear that the Pennsylvania FBI 
office did pass on the results of the search of his residence.  Special Agent Baldwin 
confirmed that there was correspondence between the Houston and Pennsylvania 
divisions after the discovery of the lithium nitrate and mercury switch.242     
                                                 





Yes. Again, according to the official FBI complaint, there were several instances 
in which undercover agents from the Pennsylvania division shared information with the 
Houston office.  They conducted surveillance of Grecula, collecting information on his 
daily activities, vehicle location, telephone protocol, and eventual departure for Houston.  
Information from the recorded telephone conversations was also passed between the two 
offices to support the investigation.243  
Assessment.  Though Grecula did not exhibit any sort of ideological connection to jihad, 
his overt willingness to support Al Qaeda was still of serious concern.  Confidential 
sources contributed overwhelmingly to the foiling of his plot.  A chance relationship with 
an FBI informant exposed the initial plan and the use of undercover agents and 
techniques helped to confirm it.  The Internet, however, was not applicable in this case.  
As evidenced by the FBI criminal complaint, Grecula was quite open (and detailed) with 
his intentions over the phone and in meetings with the undercover agents.  The success of 
the investigation was also contingent on the cooperation between two geographically 
separated FBI offices, which conducted different activities yet maintained open lines of 
communication to facilitate each other’s efforts. 
F. NAJIBULLAH ZAZI—DENVER, CO (2009) 
Najibullah Zazi.  Born in Afghanistan, Zazi moved to Pakistan at age 7.  He and his 
family emigrated to the U.S. in 1999 and settled in New York, where he worked as a 
coffee vendor for several years.  Zazi moved to Aurora, Colorado in 2009 where he found 
a job as a shuttle driver at the Denver International Airport.  He admitted to having 
received weapons and explosives training from Al Qaeda during a trip to Pakistan in 
2008.244    
Summary.  In September 2009, Colorado FBI agents arrested Zazi and his father, 
Mohammed Wali Zazi, in Aurora for “knowingly and willfully making false statements 
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to the FBI in a matter involving international and domestic terrorism.”245  A few weeks 
later, a grand jury returned an indictment charging Najibullah Zazi with conspiracy to use 
weapons of mass destruction, namely improvised explosive devices, against the New 
York subway system.  Zazi later pled guilty to that charge in addition to charges of 
“conspiracy to commit murder in a foreign country and providing material support to al-
Qaeda.”246  He originally flew to Pakistan to join the Taliban but was instead recruited 
and trained by Al Qaeda and asked to carry out suicide operations in the U.S.247  He 
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Figure 9.     Najibullah Zazi Indicators  
1.  Was the information “good enough” at the time of discovery, therefore allowing 
timely intervention? 
Interpersonal Interaction 
No. Sometime after 2006, Zazi flew to Pakistan where he took a wife.  Each 
following year, he would go back, claiming to visit her.  Some of his relatives, friends 
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from the mosque, and customers who often bought coffee from him, began to notice a 
change in Zazi.  According to friends, he was never really religious when he was 
younger.  However, after visiting Pakistan a few times, he shifted from wearing Western 
clothing to a more traditional Muslim appearance.  He also took great interest in online 
videos of an Indian scholar who advocated Islamic fundamentalism.  Some said Zazi also 
became less friendly and sometimes argumentative.248  While signs of radicalization may 
have been picked up by these personal interactions, none were concrete enough to alert 
authorities to a possible homegrown jihadist plot.    
Inernet-Based 
Yes. After the FBI discovered bomb-making notes on Zazi’s computer in New 
York, officials were able to find supporting proof that Zazi did not accidentally download 
them like he claimed.  The FBI conducted a review of Zazi’s e-mail accounts and found 
that he had e-mailed himself the notes while he was in Pakistan.  Furthermore, the FBI 
discovered Zazi had conducted online research of baseball and football stadiums and the 
Grand Central Terminal in New York.249       
Incident Reports 
Yes. A number of documented incidents were key indicators of suspicious and 
possible jihadist activity.  The first, which initially tipped off the authorities to Zazi, was 
his travel to Peshawar, Pakistan in 2008.  Because Peshawar is considered a hotbed for Al 
Qaeda training and refuge, the CIA quickly took notice and reported the news of Zazi’s 
travel to the FBI.250  After Zazi’s return to the U.S. and sudden relocation to Colorado, 
the FBI initiated surveillance of his activities.  During the later stage of his plot, Zazi was 
stopped several times by police for speeding while driving cross-country overnight to 
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New York.  The FBI was reportedly made aware of each incident.251  Finally, the FBI 
took a statement from Zazi after he returned to Colorado, in which he lied about the 
bomb-making notes.  According to the criminal complaint, the FBI requested a warrant 
for Zazi’s arrest after he made the false statement.252         
Documents, Media, Material 
Yes. The authorities discovered documents, media, and material that strongly 
indicated Zazi was plotting a jihadist attack.  It was while Zazi was in New York that the 
authorities discovered his bomb-making notes on his computer.  The jpeg image of Zazi’s 
handwritten notes contained “formulations and instructions regarding the manufacture 
and handling of initiating explosives, main explosive charges, explosives detonators and 
components of a fuzing system.”253  FBI agents also found bomb components with Zazi’s 
fingerprints and traces of residue where Zazi attempted to heat chemicals.  Additionally, 
surveillance cameras in a number of beauty supply stores captured Zazi purchasing large 
quantities of hydrogen peroxide and acetone, key ingredients for his bomb.254       
Confidential Sources 
Yes. A confidential informant and numerous wiretaps provided authorities with 
telling information of a possible plot.  According to the criminal complaint, the NYPD 
lawfully intercepted phone conversations between Zazi and the informant in which the 
latter warned Zazi that the authorities were asking questions about him.  Numerous other 
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phone conversations were intercepted in which Zazi frantically sought from another 
individual the “correct mixtures of ingredients to make explosives.”255    
2.  Did the information provide, in context, “good enough” understanding to move 
forward with investigation or intervention? 
Interpersonal Interaction 
Unknown. Although Zazi’s personal relationships were not “good enough” to 
trigger early intervention, it is also unclear as to what extent they may have facilitated 
investigation after Zazi was suspected of a terrorist conspiracy.  As shown earlier, some 
of his personal contacts shared their observations of Zazi’s changing behavior, but it is 
difficult to determine if they provided information to authorities that was useful in 
advancing the investigation or in thwarting the plot.  Naiz Khan, a friend whom Zazi 
stayed with while in New York, was interviewed by the FBI after they discovered 
probable bomb components with Zazi’s fingerprints in his apartment.  Yet Khan claimed 
he knew nothing of the items nor that Zazi might have been involved in a plot.256   
Inernet-Based 
Yes. Both the e-mail history and the discovery of online searches of possible 
targets led the authorities to dig deeper into Zazi’s Internet use.  They subsequently found 
that Zazi had also conducted extensive searches on types of muriatic acid and 
hydrochloric acid to facilitate the construction of his bomb, per his written instructions.257  
Incident Reports 
Yes. The CIA’s report to the FBI of Zazi’s Peshawar, Pakistan visit appears to 
have been taken seriously even though there were little details.  After a number of FBI 
interviews in Colorado, Zazi finally admitted that he had received weapons and 
explosives training from Al Qaeda and that the bomb-making notes were actually his.258 
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Documents, Media, Material 
Yes. Zazi’s handwritten bomb-making notes were so explicit that authorities 
knew they had a possible plot on their hands.  The notes, which outlined critical 
ingredients for an explosive device, helped authorities focus subsequent searches.  As a 
result, they discovered bomb components, chemical residue, and video footage of Zazi 
purchasing abnormal quantities of chemical products that were found on his list.      
Confidential Sources 
Yes. While the informant’s phone call may not have been overly revealing, it was 
suspicious enough for authorities to pursue further surveillance of Zazi’s phone 
conversations.  Information drawn from the wiretaps allowed them to corroborate Zazi’s 
intentions with the chemicals and components that were discovered.259    
3.  Was the information shared in order to attract other useful information? 
Interpersonal Interaction 
Yes. Shortly after Zazi was arrested, a number of relatives, mosque affiliates, and 
former customers shared their stories with the authorities and media.  Though the 
information may not have been consequential to thwarting the plot, it did help authorities 
begin to piece together Zazi’s path to radicalization. 
Inernet-Based 
Yes. According to FBI reports, the e-mail and Internet information that agents 
obtained in New York was passed to the FBI division in Denver.  Agents were able to 
question Zazi about the information shortly after he returned to Colorado.260   
Incident Reports 
Yes. Interagency sharing is what set off the domestic investigation.  The CIA first 
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FBI.  Once the investigation was underway, the NYPD and New York and Denver FBI 
offices were in frequent contact, relaying information from Zazi’s police stops and 
official statements.261   
Documents, Media, Material 
Yes. As with the Internet information and incident reports, FBI and NYPD 
officials shared with each other the discoveries of the bomb-making notes and 
components.  Even though materials were found in two separate states at various 
establishments, the open lines of communication enabled the agencies to piece them 
together. 
Confidential Sources 
Yes. Several court documents indicate that the information obtained from the 
confidential informant wiretaps were shared among the FBI offices and NYPD 
throughout the extent of the investigation.262 
Assessment.  Some consider the Zazi case to be the most serious homegrown jihadist 
terrorism investigation since 9/11.263  In comparison to other homegrown attempts, Zazi 
actually had connections to Al Qaeda and technical training in improvised explosive 
devices.  Yet, as demonstrated above, there were a significant number of plot indicators 
picked up by a comprehensive array of detection measures.  Open source Internet 
exploitation, however, was not one of them.  As stated by a former analyst with the 
NYPD intelligence unit, “I think what's striking about the Zazi case is not so much that 
new tools were being used, but that old tools were being used in a comprehensive 
fashion… and that they were being stitched together in a thoughtful, strategic way, so that 
one tool naturally gave way to another.”264  This is an accurate statement, as almost every 
indicator provided authorities with “good enough” information to intervene.  Still, what is 
most illuminating from this case is the level of cooperation, sharing, and expediency 
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among numerous agencies.  The willingness to pass information across traditional 
boundaries helped the authorities stay a step ahead of Zazi and his plan to attack the New 
York subway. 
G. MICHAEL FINTON—DECATUR, IL (2009) 
Michael Finton. Finton, 29, had converted to Islam while he was in prison for 
aggravated battery and aggravated robbery charges.265  After release, he moved to 
Decatur, Illinois, in violation of his parole, to attend a mosque there.  He was arrested for 
his parole violation in August 2007.  A search of Finton’s vehicle yielded several 
personal writings, including a martyrdom letter and a note indicating that Finton had 
written a letter to John Walker Lindh, an American citizen who was captured while 
fighting for the Taliban in Afghanistan.  The FBI maintained those documents while 
Finton served another 4 months in prison.266      
Summary.  The Springfield Division of the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force arrested 
Finton in September 2009 on charges of “attempted murder of federal employees and 
attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction (explosives) in connection with a plot to 
detonate a vehicle bomb at the federal building in Springfield, Ill.”267  Finton 
unknowingly worked with a confidential informant and undercover FBI agent to develop 
his plot and attempt to carry it out until the time of his arrest.  He willingly parked a truck 
that he thought was filled with explosives near the federal building and attempted to 
detonate it remotely.  
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Figure 10.     Michael Finton Indicators  
1.  Was the information “good enough” at the time of discovery, therefore allowing 
timely intervention? 
Interpersonal Interaction 
No. Accounts of personal relationships did not come forward until after Finton 
was arrested.  While some of his former colleagues from the Richland Community 
College in Decatur described Finton as always wanting “to talk about Islam,” none 
reported suspicious behavior to authorities.268  Members of the Masjid Wali Hasan 
Islamic Society, where Finton often prayed, also stated that they saw no signs of radical 
behavior.  Shamshad Syed Ahmed, the vice president of the society’s board, described 
Finton as “very humble and very polite.”269    
Inernet-Based 
No. News reporting shows that Finton often posted about Islam-related issues on 
his MySpace page and Muslim-themed websites like muxlim.com.270  However, neither 
the detailed criminal complaint nor the indictment discusses his online rants as critical to 
                                                 




the investigation, suggesting that authorities may not have discovered them.  Of interest 
though is an independent inquiry conducted by the NEFA Foundation, which found that 
Finton expressed admiration online for known jihadist ideologues like Anwar al-Awlaki 
and Ibn Taymiyyah.271        
Incident Reports 
No. Available reporting indicates that Finton’s parole officer was more concerned 
about the parole violation and less about the underlying reasons.  The infraction simply 
was not enough to warn of homegrown jihadism.  It appears that no red flags went up 
either when Finton was stopped for speeding outside of Springfield after working all day 
on his bombing plot.  
Documents, Media, Material 
Yes. While the parole violation itself was not a warning, the results of Finton’s 
arrest and search were.  Parole officers found and turned over jihadist-themed letters to 
the FBI who later questioned Finton about them.  Finton admitted that he idolized John 
Walker Lindh, the “American Taliban,” and indeed attempted to correspond with him.272  
That signaled the FBI to promptly open an investigation into Finton’s activities.  Later 
during the investigation, Finton handed over to an undercover agent what he thought to 
be bomb components and his homemade jihadist propaganda video, providing further 
information in support of a jihadist conspiracy.273  
Confidential Sources 
Yes. According to the criminal complaint, significant information about Finton’s 
plot was provided by a confidential informant and undercover FBI agent.  Numerous 
conversations held between each source reveal Finton’s candor about joining the jihad 
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and damaging the U.S. government.  On more than one occasion, Finton expressed his 
willingness to wage jihad and the progress of his plot (e.g., potential targets and 
reconnaissance he had conducted).  This enabled the FBI to plan their intervention 
accordingly.274   
2.  Did the information provide, in context, “good enough” understanding to move 
forward with investigation or intervention? 
Interpersonal Interaction 
No. Statements from colleagues and mosque associates indicate that, at best, 
Finton was passionate about Islam and was always willing to discuss the topic.  However, 
it appears that Finton did not communicate his attraction to jihad openly in those forums, 
thereby providing little reason for alarm.  Furthermore, the statements came after Finton 
was arrested and when the authorities already had sufficient information to foil his plot.     
Inernet-Based 
No. Though Finton’s publicly-available Internet posts may have provided some 
insight into his leanings, it does not appear that authorities came across them or found 
them useful to the investigation. 
Incident Reports 
No. Neither Finton’s parole violation nor his traffic violation provided suspicion 
of jihadist activity.  It was the subsequent search following his arrest for violating parole 
that tipped off authorities.    
Documents, Media, Material 
Yes. Finton’s jihadist-themed letters did indeed provide enough understanding to 
move forward with investigation.  Numerous references to death, martyrdom, and another 
American jihadist were important signals that compelled the FBI to question Finton and 
facilitate a relationship with a confidential informant.  The video and components Finton 
later produced gave authorities proof of his intent to carry out an attack.    
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Confidential Sources 
Yes. The criminal complaint reveals that information obtained by persistent use of 
the informant and agent advanced the investigation to a successful, well-timed 
intervention.  Finton divulged every detail of his plot to both individuals.  The FBI was 
able to manipulate the information to set up a scenario in which they could effectively 
catch Finton in the act.  The result was an attempted vehicle-borne explosive attack 
against a federal building, which Finton wholeheartedly agreed to carry out to the end.   
3.  Was the information shared in order to attract other useful information?  
Interpersonal Interaction 
Unknown. Those who knew Finton from school or the mosque provided their 
accounts of his character to the media after his arrest.  It is not clear, though, that the 
information was shared with the authorities or if it attracted other useful information. 
Inernet-Based 
No. According to court records, the Internet information was not even considered 
in the case. 
Incident Reports 
Yes. News of Finton’s parole violation was shared with the FBI after parole 
officers discovered the documents in his truck.  Also, details of Finton’s speeding ticket 
from a Springfield Deputy Sheriff indicate that the information was obtained by the 
FBI.275    
Documents, Media, Material 
Yes. While it is not clear if information of the video or components was shared 
widely, it is clear that the parole office promptly shared the seized jihadist documents 
with the FBI.  The sharing of that information was critical to the opening of this 
investigation.     
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Confidential Sources 
Yes. Records show that the Springfield FBI division handled both the informant 
and undercover agent.  However, the indictment also states that the investigation was 
supported by other law enforcement agencies as part of the Joint Terrorism Task Force, 
which according to the Springfield FBI website is comprised of 30 partner agencies.276  
Information from the confidential sources was likely shared in order to coordinate the 
extensive surveillance and artificial vehicle attack.  
Assessment.  Finton’s written and spoken statements pointed authorities to a clear, well-
defined homegrown jihadist threat.  Persistent use of confidential sources resulted in 
critical information about capability and intent, allowing the FBI and its partners to stay 
steps ahead.  Certainly, part of the success can be attributed to Finton’s own negligence 
and candor, exhibited by his willingness to profess his jihadist leanings in person, on 
paper and video, and online.  Although his Internet postings were not indicators for 
authorities during the investigation, the nature of those posts suggests they could have 
been supportive of information collected from those other sources.  Products like the 
NEFA report could have provided a contextual analysis.  Nevertheless, interagency 
cooperation and effective use of a small number of tools detected the threat and enabled 
successful intervention. 
H. HOSAM SMADI—DALLAS, TX (2009) 
Hosam Maher Husein Smadi. Smadi, a Jordanian native, came to the United States in 
2007 on a visitor visa.  He lived south of Dallas, Texas, where he held a job at a roadside 
barbecue restaurant.  After his visa expired, Smadi remained in the U.S. illegally, 
spending most of his time away from work online.277  
Summary.  Smadi, 19 at the time, was arrested September 24, 2009 by FBI agents when 
he attempted to detonate a truck bomb outside a Dallas skyscraper.  He unknowingly 
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worked with undercover FBI agents, who were posing as members of an Al Qaeda 
sleeper cell, to further his plot until the time of his arrest.  The FBI claims that Smadi first 
came to their attention when agents monitoring jihadist Internet sites came across a 
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Figure 11.     Hosam Smadi Indicators  
1.  Was the information “good enough” at the time of discovery, therefore allowing 
timely intervention? 
Interpersonal Interaction 
No. According to reports from family members and friends, Smadi’s character 
never gave way to suspicion that he was interested in jihad.  Those who knew him 
growing up said that he was far from being a strict Muslim and often attended chapel 
with his Christian friends.  Smadi’s friends in the U.S. said that he exhibited some 
teenage angst but nothing extremist.279  He “loved techno music, wore earrings, drank 
and smoked cigarettes—behavior frowned upon by strict adherents of Islam.”280 
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Yes. FBI reports and court documents claim that Smadi’s violent rhetoric on a 
radical Islamic website alerted them to a possible jihadist threat.  Special Agent Tom 
Petrowski, who led the investigation, said “he [Smadi] was on a very extreme website, 
where people were saying a lot of unspeakable things, endorsing and celebrating acts of 
violence against U.S. citizens and our allies.”  Petrowski said further, “what made 
Smadi’s postings stand out from the other rhetoric was that he was saying, ‘I want to act.’  
That’s what really got our attention.”281      
Incident Reports 
Yes. Authorities discovered that Smadi overstayed his visa after they had 
suspected him of contemplating a jihadist attack.  Special Agent Petrowski noted that law 
enforcement knew they could have immediately arrested and deported Smadi, but chose 
not to because they felt they would only be displacing the threat.282  
Media 
Yes. Authorities obtained from Smadi a homemade propaganda video that he 
made for Osama bin Laden, signaling that he was about to carry out an attack on U.S. 
soil.  In it he proclaims, “The date of the blessed strikes, September 11, was a celebration 
for us, so let us make another date become a celebration for us that history will mark for 
us.”283   
Confidential Sources 
Yes. The criminal complaint shows that after Smadi was found online, significant 
information about his terror plot was obtained by two undercover FBI agents, both native 
Arabic speakers. Several conversations held between each source illuminate Smadi’s 
enthusiasm for jihad and perseverance to conduct an attack against the U.S.  On more 
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than one occasion, Smadi discussed potential targets, reconnaissance he had conducted, 
and the possible damage he could incur.  This information allowed the FBI to plan an 
intervention that would catch Smadi in the act.284 
2.  Did the information provide, in context, “good enough” understanding to move 
forward with investigation or intervention? 
Interpersonal Interaction 
No. The few character references from family and friends did not provide “good 
enough” information to assist the investigation.  As in many other cases, the observations 
came forward after the individual was detained.  Even still, when it did come forward, the 
information did not reveal insight into Smadi’s jihadist leanings.   
Inernet-Based 
Yes. An FBI agent who was specifically monitoring jihadist websites came across 
a message Smadi had posted online under the screen name, “Aba Al-Ayyubi.”  In 
response to a long thread of increasingly violent discussion, Smadi posted in Arabic, 
“Brothers…I am currently in America and I am able to strike their interests in their own 
home however I only need help with the tools…Allah willing we will strike them on their 
heads…”285  The agent came across several other messages by Smadi repeating that he 
was in prime position to wage jihad but only needed the tools.  According to Petrowski, 
an FBI Behavioral Analysis team evaluated the online vitriol and determined that “Smadi 
was not making empty threats.”286  They chose to then make direct e-mail contact with 
Smadi to find out who he was and what he was conspiring.  
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Incident Reports 
Yes. In context, the knowledge that Smadi overstayed his visa appeared to support 
his desire to infiltrate and attack America.  The authorities pressed forward with the 
investigation, armed with the knowledge that they could at least deport Smadi if he fell 
short of trying to conduct an attack. 
Media 
Yes. Smadi’s propaganda video was made with the help of undercover agents 
shortly before he attempted to detonate the truck bomb.  This video gave authorities 
further evidence of Smadi’s intent to act and therefore prompted measures to detain him 
in the process.287   
Confidential Sources 
Yes. According to the criminal complaint, the information an undercover agent 
received from Smadi provided sufficient understanding to continue investigation of a 
jihadist conspiracy.  Smadi told the agent numerous times “his intention to serve as a 
soldier for Usama bin Laden and al-Qa’ida, and to conduct violent jihad.”288  The 
complaint states that undercover agents communicated with Smadi over 60 times after the 
initial contact via e-mail, phone, and in person.289  Smadi provided the agents with 
elaborate details and timelines of his plot.  Authorities used this information to maneuver 
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3.  Was the information shared in order to attract other useful information? 
Interpersonal Interaction 
Unknown. Smadi’s family and friends recounted their relationships to the 
teenager with the media after his arrest.  It is not clear, though, that the information was 
shared with the authorities or if it attracted other useful information. 
Inernet-Based 
Yes. Several sources indicate that there was significant cooperation and 
information sharing throughout this case.290  While all the details are not known, some of 
these sources assert that Smadi’s public Web postings were shared among behavioral 
specialists, language analysts, agencies of the Dallas JTTF, and the Counterterrorism 
Division in Washington, DC.291  These specialists were able to evaluate the credibility of 
Smadi’s postings and validate the FBI’s reason for concern.      
Incident Reports 
Yes. According to Special Agent Petrowski, law enforcement agencies other than 
the FBI were made aware of both Smadi’s expired visa and the decision to not deport him 
until further investigation could be conducted.292   
Media 
Yes. As suggested previously, language analysts played a key role in translating 
Smadi’s communications.  An English transcript of Smadi’s videotaped speech, which 
was recorded in Arabic, suggests that these analysts were called upon.293  The videotape 
was likely shared with the JTTF partners investigating the case.    
                                                 
290 United States v. Hosam Maher Husein Smadi, Criminal Complaint No. 3-09-MJ-286; Federal 
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2009, http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/txn/PressRel09/smadi_indict_pr.html (accessed October 20, 2010). 
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Bureau of Investigation, “Terror Plot Foiled: Inside the Smadi Case.” 
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the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas, 
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Confidential Sources 
Yes. Similar to the Internet information, the information from the undercover 
agents was shared with other task force partners to assess Smadi’s capability and 
commitment.  It also was shared to ensure that Smadi believed he was going to carry out 
a real attack.  For example, a month before the attempted attack, Smadi disclosed to an 
agent the size and expectations of the bomb to be used.  Bomb experts were able to use 
this information to craft a phony yet convincing bomb made to Smadi’s specifications.294  
Assessment.  The above review shows that a number of sources provided critical 
indications of a jihadist plot.  Once discovered, the information was analyzed by partner 
agencies and used to guide further investigation.  As in other cases, skilled undercover 
agents were able to get in close with Smadi to confirm his intentions and ultimately drive 
him to his demise.  But before that could be done, a gateway was required.  This case 
revealed that the FBI was actively monitoring jihadist-themed Internet sites, searching for 
that gateway.  When they discovered online rhetoric that was abnormally explicit, they 
conducted language and credibility analysis to steer follow-on actions, thereby setting a 
precedent for the technique.  Special Agent Petrowski voiced, “one big takeaway from 
this case is the question of how many other potential violent extremists are out there, 
being exposed to terrorist ideologies online and contemplating an attack.”295  This case 
suggests the FBI and the multi-agency task forces are going online to answer that 
question. 
I. TOLEDO THREE—TOLEDO, OH (2006) 
Mohammed Zaki Amawi. A resident of Toledo, Ohio with both Jordanian and U.S. 
citizenship, Amawi was considered the de facto leader of the homegrown cell.  He 
worked at a local travel agency and met the other cell members through the Masjid Saad 
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and Masid At-Tawfeeq mosques.  Amawi reportedly attempted to enter Iraq through 
Jordan to join the insurgency in 2003, prior to meeting the other two men.296    
Marwan Othman El-Hindi. A naturalized U.S. citizen born in Jordan, El-Hindi had 
apparently received early FBI attention in 2002 when he was cited at an Islamic 
fundamentalist meeting as “‘one of the brothers from Toledo’ who was adept at coming 
up with money-making schemes.”297  In fact, he used past lessons learned to create a 
fraudulent charity organization in support of the group’s conspiracy.298 
Wassim I. Mazloum. Mazloum was born in Lebanon but was a legal permanent resident 
of the U.S.  He owned and operated two car dealerships in Toledo, which he offered to 
provide as cover during the group’s conspiracy to join the Iraq insurgency.299 
Summary.  In February 2006, the three men from Toledo were arrested and subsequently 
indicted for “conspiring to kill or maim persons outside the United States, including U.S. 
military personnel serving in Iraq, and conspiring to provide material support to 
terrorists.”300  According to reports, the authorities uncovered the conspiracy when the 
cell unknowingly worked with an FBI informant to conduct planning and training in 
preparation to join the Iraq insurgency.  The informant, a former Special Forces soldier, 
had assumed the identity of an “Islamic extremist” in order to penetrate the cell.301 
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Figure 12.     Toledo Three Indicators  
1.  Was the information “good enough” at the time of discovery, therefore allowing 
timely intervention? 
Interpersonal Interaction 
Yes. Details are not clear, but several reports claim that the Toledo Muslim 
community had alerted both local and federal authorities about extremist attitudes of 
some of the men 18 months prior to their arrest.302  FBI Special Agent Ted Wasky later 
told the press that “individuals within Toledo's Muslim community contacted the FBI 
about what he termed the ‘violent and radical views’ the suspects were articulating.”303  
The authorities acted on this information with the assistance of a confidential informant.   
Inernet-Based 
Yes. While it does not appear that authorities were conducting active Internet 
monitoring, court records show that the cell’s Internet activities were a significant 




                                                 
302 Institute for Preventive Strategies, “Preventing Jihad in Toledo,” 5; Wilkinson and Hall, “3 
charged in terror plot; local suspects planned attacks in Iraq, U.S. says.” 
303 WTOL News, “Toledo's Arab Community Called ‘Crucial’ to Terrorism Investigation,” WTOL 
website, February 21, 2006, http://www.wtol.com/global/Story.asp?s=4533250 (accessed October 12, 
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downloading violent videos and instructional manuals, all of which they shared with the 
confidential informant.  El-Hindi also frequently sent incriminating e-mails to the 
informant.304 
Incident Reports 
Yes. Two important incidents signaled the scale of the cell’s operation and need 
for intervention.  The first was the discovery of a fraudulent charity organization that El-
Hindi created to acquire federal grant money.  While he and a co-conspirator were 
indicted separately for the fraud, the scheme caused the FBI to suspect that it might be 
tied to funding terrorist operations, given El-Hindi’s previous connections.305  The second 
incident was a report of Amawi’s travel to Jordan in August 2005.  Accompanied by the 
informant, Amawi flew to Jordan, carrying with him five computers he stated he intended 
to give to the mujahideen “brothers.”306 
Documents, Media, Material 
Yes. During one meeting, Amawi handed over a CD to the informant that had a 
video entitled “Martyrdom Operation Vest Preparation,” which detailed the construction 
of a suicide bomb vest.  Amawi told the informant that he wanted him to download the 
video to his own computer for use in the cell’s jihadist training.307  On a separate 
occasion, Amawi passed the informant a note with a code word representing a chemical 
explosive the cell was trying to acquire.308  And, as noted previously, Amawi procured 
laptop computers that were meant for Iraq insurgents.  All of these items provided 
authorities with concrete proof of a jihadist conspiracy.  
Confidential Sources 
Yes. Court records indicate that the majority of information of the cell’s activities 
came from the confidential informant.  Notably, the informant was not originally aware 
                                                 
304 United States v. Mohammed Zaki Amawi et al., Case No. 3:06CR719, Indictment, February 16, 
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of this particular cell, as he was tasked by the FBI to observe other undisclosed 
individuals at the mosque.  According to the informant, Amawi and El-Hindi actually 
sought him out, convinced by the guise that he was a former soldier turned jihadist.  They 
approached him, asking specifically for violent jihad training, and thereby triggering an 
in-depth investigation.309 
2.  Did the information provide, in context, “good enough” understanding to move 
forward with investigation or intervention? 
Interpersonal Interaction 
Yes. Media reports contend that the tipoffs from the Toledo Muslim community 
were “good enough” for the FBI to begin targeting suspicious individuals.  While the 
nature of the tips remained confidential, the information led to the targeting of nearly 20 
people from the local mosques.  The informant was inserted in an effort to collect further 
information on possible homegrown extremists.310    
Inernet-Based 
Yes. Once authorities were made aware of the extensive Internet use by the cell, 
the prosecution was able to later then trace and attribute the multitude of violence-related 
posts the men had communicated on online forums.  For example, Amawi made contact 
with a supposed Syrian jihadist in which they discussed attempts to acquire an explosive 
substance called astrolite.311  El-Hindi posted repeatedly “I am a terrorist” and “kill Jews 
and Americans” on the jihadist website Ekhlass.312  It was posts like these that helped the 
prosecution demonstrate the cell’s commitment to carrying out jihad against Americans.  
Incident Reports 
Yes. Suspicious of El-Hindi’s charity organization, the FBI, with the assistance of 
the IRS, discovered that El-Hindi was in fact pocketing the organization’s funds for 
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himself and the cell’s plot.  Authorities determined he had defrauded the government of 
over $40,000.313  Following up on Amawi’s intentions to travel to Jordan, the FBI 
worked with Jordanian authorities to track the conspirator when he arrived and ultimately 
arrested him in February 2006.314    
Documents, Media, Material 
Yes. The contents of Amawi’s CD (and several others later seized) were heavily 
analyzed during investigation.  Court records state that authorities were able to establish 
that Amawi’s “‘world class’ collection of violent jihadist propaganda, terrorist training 
materials, extremist doctrine and videos… constitutes convincing evidence of his 
commitment…”315  Furthermore, the laptops he carried with him to Jordan gave proof of 
his attempt to provide material support to terrorists.  The Department of Justice 
confirmed that Amawi was prevented from delivering the computers.316  
Confidential Sources 
Yes. Because the informant was the sole material witness, the information he 
collected effectively steered the investigation.  From the moment he was approached by 
the cell until the final arrest, the informant documented many of the key activities for 
which the men were indicted to include weapons training, distribution of bomb-making 
information, material support, and explicit verbal threats to kill the President of the 
United States.317  
3.  Was the information shared in order to attract other useful information? 
Interpersonal Interaction 
Yes. While the Toledo Muslim community was generally unaware of the specifics  
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of the cell’s conspiracy, it did have a sense that there were radicals among them.  By 
sharing that information with local and federal authorities they were able to effectively 
help remove the threat. 
Inernet-Based 
Yes. In addition to the FBI’s analysis of the Web postings, the U.S. Attorney’s 
Office for the Northern District of Ohio requested an analyst from the NEFA Foundation 
to review the evidence and provide expert witness testimony.  He concluded to the court 
that the “material is very likely to be useful to a person or persons conspiring to join a 
terrorist organization or preparing an act of terrorism.”318 
Incident Reports 
Yes. The FBI worked with the IRS to establish that El-Hindi’s fraudulent 
organization was indeed a cover for jihadist funding.  Furthermore, the FBI worked with 
Jordanian officials and presumably U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement to secure 
Amawi and return him to the U.S for trial.319 
Documents, Media, Material 
Yes. In addition to the Internet information, the NEFA analyst was asked to assess 
the CDs containing the jihadist videos and training documents.  He concluded that the 
information was also representative of Al Qaeda’s ideology and encouraging for aspiring 
jihadists.320     
Confidential Sources 
Yes. Department of Justice records indicate that several members of the Toledo 
JTTF and other law enforcement agencies assisted in the case.321  Because the 
confidential informant was the key node for all information regarding the cell’s activities, 
it is reasonable to imply that his findings were shared with the partner agencies. 
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Assessment.  The “Toledo Three” conspiracy was thwarted by community awareness, 
inside help, and effective information sharing.  It is evident, however, that much of the 
success rests upon the confidential informant who was actually solicited by the plotters.  
Without his alert, many of the other indicators may have been overlooked and the men 
could have slipped away to Iraq.  That point aside, this case does show the significant 
contribution that open source Internet information offered.  While it was not actively 
monitored, it was later collected and analyzed by both authorities and private partners to 
demonstrate that the homegrown cell had capability and intent to wage violent jihad.  
This is important as the cell was not caught actually conducting an attack or joining the 
insurgency.  Authorities were able to lawfully preempt the plot by identifying critical 
information that, when synthesized, showed a logical progression toward actual violence. 
J. GEORGIA PLOTTERS—ATLANTA, GA (2006) 
Syed Haris Ahmed. A naturalized citizen originally from Pakistan, Ahmed was a 
mechanical engineering student at Georgia Tech University and worked part time at a 
perfume shop.322  He frequently attended the Al-Farooq Masjid mosque near the Georgia 
Tech campus.323  In July 2005, he traveled to Pakistan in an attempt to receive terrorist 
training and to join in fighting.324 
Ehsanul Islam Sadequee. Sadequee was a U.S. citizen born in Fairfax, Virginia and 
lived with his family in Roswell, Georgia.  He reportedly worked for the Atlanta-based 
non-profit group Raksha, which addresses South Asian community issues in the Atlanta 
area.325  He befriended Ahmed through the Al-Farooq Masjid mosque.326  While his 
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partner was in Pakistan, Sadequee traveled to Bangladesh to work more closely with 
members of a group called “Al Qaeda in Northern Europe.”327     
Summary.  In 2006, following the investigation by the Atlanta JTTF, Ahmed and 
Sadequee were charged with conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists and the 
designated foreign terrorist organization, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LET).328  Ahmed and 
Sadequee were first arrested for making false statements to the FBI concerning their 
foreign travel as related to an ongoing terrorism investigation.  The men were alleged to 
have begun their quest for jihad on extremist websites, engaging with other would-be 
terrorists in Canada and Great Britain.  Through these connections, they joined in a 
conspiracy that crossed international boundaries yet included targets within the U.S.  
Spokesmen for the case said that the two men did not present immediate danger, 
however, they asserted that “in the post-9/11 world we will not wait to disrupt terrorism-
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Figure 13.     Georgia Plotters Indicators  
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1.  Was the information “good enough” at the time of discovery, therefore allowing 
timely intervention? 
Interpersonal Interaction 
No. After the men’s arrest, the families were interviewed several times by state 
and federal authorities and the media.  According to reports from family members, none 
knew how devoted the young men were to carrying out jihad and therefore provided no 
indications to authorities.  Dr. Tameema Ahmed, a college professor and Syed Ahmed’s 
father, thought his son had always just been emotional and concerned about worldly 
affairs.  Ahmed’s sister said that her brother was always trying to get the family to be 
more religious, but she did not see the violent leanings.330  Likewise, Sadequee’s family 
said they were “very shocked and startled and hurt” by the news that he was arrested for 
involvement with jihadist terrorism.331   
Inernet-Based 
Yes. Several reports and court documents claim that overly suspicious posts by 
Canadian nationals and others on jihadist Web forums were discovered by the Canadian 
Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and the private U.S.-based Internet monitoring 
group, SITE.  These discoveries apparently set off an investigation of the “Toronto 18” 
jihadist cell, which authorities would later find had conspired with Ahmed and 
Sadequee.332      
Incident Reports 
Yes. After the investigation into the Toronto cell had begun, the FBI found out 
from Canadian authorities that Ahmed and Sadequee possibly had met with the cell in  
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March 2005.  Because the cell was under investigation for jihadist conspiracy, the 
authorities had good enough reasoning to question the two Americans about the purpose 
of their travel.333     
Media 
Yes. Canadian authorities discovered that the central coordinating figure among 
the extremist websites was Younis Tsouli, a propagandist and recruiter for Al Qaeda in 
Iraq.  In October 2005, British officials arrested Tsouli and found in his residence video 
clips of Washington monuments.  Tsouli revealed that the clips were sent by Sadequee, 
therefore sending another flag to U.S. authorities that the Georgia pair was involved in a 
conspiracy.334  
Confidential Sources 
Yes. Mubin Shaikh, an informant who had penetrated the Canadian cell, reported 
that he overheard that the two Americans were looking to seek safe haven in Canada if 
they were to plan and carry out attacks in the U.S.:  “The chatter was that an attack of 
some sort was going to be planned. And the setup was that the attack would be planned 
and the attack would be carried out and they [the Americans] would fall back over to the 
border in Canada... and we would give them logistical support on this end.”335  
2.  Did the information provide, in context, “good enough” understanding to move 
forward with investigation or intervention? 
Interpersonal Interaction 
No. The men’s families claimed to know nothing of their jihadist activities and 
appeared to provide little useful information to the investigation. 
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Inernet-Based 
Yes. The jihadist Web forums were in fact good enough sources of information 
for further inquiry.  Authorities monitoring the sites soon found out that the users were 
not limited to the Canadian cell.  In fact, they came across terror suspects originating in 
the United Kingdom, Australia, Sweden and elsewhere, setting off multiple investigations 
that would lead to their eventual arrest.336  Ahmed and Sadequee were also found to be 
frequent contributors to the forums, which they used to coordinate trips to Canada, 
Pakistan, and Bangladesh in support of their plot.337  Because the Internet seemed to be a 
critical node in the case, an analyst from a private monitoring group was brought in to 
demonstrate the very real linkages to terrorist groups like Al Qaeda and LET that existed.  
The analyst synthesized voluminous open source information from the websites, showing 
the communications structure of the jihadist network of which the two Americans and 
others were members.338 
Incident Reports 
Yes. Ahmed was interviewed several times about his Canada trip by the FBI over 
a period of eight days.  “Amid efforts to deny his illegal activities and mislead the agents, 
Ahmed made increasingly incriminating statements,” according to a Department of 
Justice report.339  The FBI was trying to compare information they obtained from 
Sadequee about the pair’s international travel.  When the information did not match up, 
the FBI conducted a travel records investigation, confirming the men had lied.  They 
were then arrested for providing false statements.340   
Media 
Yes. The authorities were interested to find out further the purpose of the videos 
that were found in Tsouli’s possession abroad.  The FBI subsequently determined that the 
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videos were, in fact, casing videos of potential targets.  In April 2005, Ahmed and 
Sadequee traveled to Washington, D.C. and recorded images of the Capitol, World Bank, 
Masonic temple, and a fuel tank farm.  The videos were then sent out to establish the 
men’s credibility and to aid in jihadist planning.341    
Confidential Sources 
Yes. The authorities understood clearly the informant’s report of a Canadian and 
American connection.  Armed with that knowledge, the FBI was able pursue a series of 
interviews of Ahmed and Sadequee, as discussed earlier, to determine the extent of that 
connection.  
3.  Was the information shared in order to attract other useful information? 
Interpersonal Interaction 
Yes. Reports indicate that the families of both men spoke to several state and 
federal authorities as part of the investigation.342  This at least gave the authorities a sense 
of the relationships and levels of communication with the men.  As noted earlier, 
however, the families did not appear to offer indication of jihadist activity. 
Inernet-Based 
Yes. The Internet information was shared across several organizations in a 
number of countries.  The Canadian intelligence service and SITE both uncovered 
information critical to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, who arrested the Toronto 
cell.  The information pertaining to Younis Tsouli was also shared with British 
authorities.  Likewise, U.S. authorities were led to Ahmed and Sadequee’s Web posts 
with the assistance of foreign agencies and private Internet monitors and analysts.343  
Incident Reports 
Yes. When the official statements by Ahmed and Sadequee did not agree, the FBI 
contacted Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).  ICE records showed the men 
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crossing the border from Canada back into the U.S. on March 12, 2005.  The FBI also 
obtained from Greyhound confirmation that the men had indeed traveled together on a 
bus from Atlanta to Toronto.344  Additionally, the warrant for the men’s arrest, which 
detailed then-known activities and the contents of their false statements, was made 
available to other U.S. and foreign law enforcement and the International Criminal Police 
Organization (INTERPOL).345 
Media 
Yes. The videos discovered in Tsouli’s residence were shared with U.S. 
authorities as part of what clearly had become an international investigation.  The FBI 
was then able to trace the videos back to the April 2005 trip Ahmed and Sadequee had 
made to Washington, D.C. 
Confidential Sources 
Yes. While it is not known if Shaikh ever had direct contact with U.S. authorities, 
it is clear that significant cross-border and interagency cooperation ensured that the 
informant’s knowledge of the Americans and their co-conspirators was communicated.346 
Assessment.  The successful intervention of the “Georgia Plotters” case clearly was a 
multilateral effort that relied upon sources of information from all categories.  The 
analysis of this case reveals several important take-aways.  The first is that open source 
exploitation of the Internet not only “sensed” a possible jihadist plot, it also helped 
identify the network of actors and determined the credibility of the threat they posed.  
This allowed authorities to focus their investigative efforts.  Furthermore, they relied 
upon analyses from both government agencies and private specialists.  Second, this case 
once again highlights the indispensability of confidential informants.  An “inside man” 
often is able to thread together the abundance of information that is collected from other 
sources.  The concern that remains, however, is that the job is risky and there are no 
guarantees that a viable informant can be found in every situation.  Finally, this case 
                                                 
344 United States v. Ehsanul Islam Sadequee, No. M-06-335. 
345 Ibid. 
346 Public Broadcasting Service, “Canada: The Cell Next Door,” under ‘Interview: Neil Docherty.’ 
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illuminates the extent to which information sharing across agencies (and borders) can 
effectively disrupt the plots of homegrown jihadists, whose networks may extend beyond 
local boundaries. 
K. COLLEEN LAROSE—PENNSBURG, PA (2009) 
Colleen R. LaRose. A U.S. citizen and Pennsylvania resident, LaRose commonly 
referred to herself as “JihadJane” or “Fatima Larose,” her online aliases.  She moved 
from Texas to Pennsburg, near Philadelphia, sometime in 2004 where she was 
unemployed and had a live-in boyfriend.  LaRose, who was never considered religious 
and apparently never attended a mosque, declared herself a “desperate” Muslim supporter 
on a 2008 YouTube video.347    
Summary.  LaRose was arrested in October 2009 immediately after returning from a trip 
she took to Europe in an attempt to track down and kill Swedish cartoonist Lars Vilks.  
She was charged with “conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists, conspiracy to 
kill in a foreign country, making false statements to a government official and attempted 
identity theft.”348  Her indictment states that LaRose used the Internet to recruit men to 
conduct violent jihad in South Asia and Europe, and to recruit women with passports to 
travel in support of the jihad.349  LaRose was apparently brought to the authorities’ 
attention by civilian web-monitoring groups who had been tracking her online posts for 
three years.350 
                                                 
347 Maryclaire Dale, “Colleen LaRose: Accused 'Jihad Jane' Pleads Not Guilty,” Huffington Post, 
March 18, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/03/18/colleen-larose-accused-ji_n_504401.html 
(accessed November 1, 2010). 
348 Department of Justice, “Pennsylvania Woman Indicted in Plot to Recruit Violent Jihadist Fighters 
and to Commit Murder Overseas,” Press Release, March 9, 2010, 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/March/10-ag-238.html (accessed November 1, 2010). 
349 Ibid. 
350 Eamon McNiff, “Net Posse Tracked Jihad Jane for Three Years,” ABC News website, March 11, 
2010, http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/Technology/internet-monitors-tracked-jihad-jane-
years/story?id=10069484 (accessed November 1, 2010); Ian Urbina, “Views of ‘JihadJane’ Were Unknown 
to Neighbors,” New York Times, March 10, 2010, 
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Figure 14.     Colleen LaRose Indicators  
1.  Was the information “good enough” at the time of discovery, therefore allowing 
timely intervention? 
Interpersonal Interaction 
No. According to media reports, neither LaRose’s live-in boyfriend, Kurt 
Gorman, nor their apartment neighbors suspected her involvement in a jihadist 
conspiracy.  Gorman claimed that he was not even aware of LaRose’s interest in Islam 
and that she spent most of her time on the computer and taking care of Gorman’s elderly 
father.351  He told reporters “she seemed normal to me” and “she wasn’t no rocket 
scientist.”352  Kristy Newell, who lived across the hall from the couple, stated that 
LaRose never exhibited indications of being Muslim and was often “seen staggering, 
drunk, up and down the street before her companion came to get her.”353   
Inernet-Based 
Yes. Court records and several media reports show that authorities first became 
aware of LaRose’s extremist leanings through her online posts on popular websites like 
YouTube and on jihadist websites.  According to the indictment, her first overt act in 
connection with the conspiracy to provide material support was a comment she posted in 
                                                 
351 Dale, “Colleen LaRose: Accused 'Jihad Jane' Pleads Not Guilty.” 
352 Christina Lamb, “Jihad Janes spread fear in suburban US,” The Sunday Times, March 14, 2010, 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_americas/article7060959.ece (accessed November 1, 
2010). 
353 Urbina, “Views of ‘JihadJane’ Were Unknown to Neighbors.” 
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June 2008 under the alias “JihadJane,” stating that she was “desperate to do something 
somehow to help the suffering Muslim people.”354  In June 2009, LaRose reportedly 
created a public account in which she openly solicited online for funds to support 
terrorism.  An alert member of the volunteer Web group YouTube Smackdown, which 
identifies jihadist videos and tries to have them removed, had long been monitoring 
LaRose’s online activity and discovered the solicitation scheme.  The Web monitor 
claimed, “I knew she had become a real threat for our safety and had officially violated 
U.S. Federal Law…I formally called the FBI in Philadelphia to report her.”355  
Incident Reports 
Yes. Aware that LaRose was trying to petition jihadist support online, the FBI 
formally questioned her in July 2009 about soliciting funds for terrorism, posting on 
jihadist websites, and using the online alias “JihadJane.”  LaRose provided a false 
statement, denying knowledge of each claim.356  Her false statement gave authorities 
reason to believe she was covering something up.  When a month later LaRose 
unexpectedly left the U.S. for Europe without her boyfriend’s knowledge, the FBI was 
convinced that she was furthering her conspiracy.357 
Documents 
Yes. The FBI found out that LaRose stole her boyfriend Gorman’s passport 
without his knowledge when she left for Europe.  This discovery was significant to 
authorities as LaRose had been posting online about using passports to support her 
jihadist “brothers.”358  
 
                                                 
354 United States v. Colleen R. LaRose, Criminal No. 10-Cr-123, in the U.S. District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, March 4, 2010, 
http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/1196.pdf (accessed November 1, 2010), 2–3. 
355 McNiff, “Net Posse Tracked Jihad Jane for Three Years.” 
356 United States v. Colleen R. LaRose, Criminal No. 10-Cr-123, 6. 
357 Ibid., 7; Lamb, “Jihad Janes spread fear in suburban US.” 
358 United States v. Colleen R. LaRose, Criminal No. 10-Cr-123, 7; Department of Justice, 
“Pennsylvania Woman Indicted in Plot to Recruit Violent Jihadist Fighters and to Commit Murder 
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2.  Did the information provide, in context, “good enough” understanding to move 
forward with investigation or intervention? 
Interpersonal Interaction 
Unknown. Available sources do not specify if Gorman went to authorities after 
discovering that LaRose had fled.  It is therefore difficult to determine whether he 
provided information supportive of the ongoing investigation.  
Inernet-Based 
Yes. The FBI appears to have paid considerable attention to LaRose’s subsequent 
Web posts following the initial alert to her Internet activity.  Many of her comments and 
the responses they received were rather incriminating.  For example, an unidentified co-
conspirator confirmed on LaRose’s online forum that funds LaRose had solicited for her 
jihad would be transferred.359  While in Europe she openly declared, “only death will stop 
me now I am so close to the target,” referring to the Swedish cartoonist she conspired to 
kill.360  Though not specifically stated in the indictment, it is also apparent that the 
authorities later gained access to some of LaRose’s personal e-mails, which provided 
further proof of her intent.  In a series of e-mail exchanges with a foreign co-conspirator, 
LaRose agreed to fly to Sweden and kill the cartoonist, stating in one instance “I will 
make this my goal till I achieve it or die trying.”361            
Incident Reports 
Yes. LaRose’s false statement did give authorities enough understanding to 
continue investigation and to later indict her for lying.  The FBI continued to track 
LaRose’s movements and communications even while she was in Europe, finding further 
proof of illegal activity.  Knowing that her overseas travel was in connection with a 
conspiracy to kill in a foreign country, the authorities finally moved in to stop her.362 
 
                                                 
359 United States v. Colleen R. LaRose, Criminal No. 10-Cr-123, 5. 
360 Lamb, “Jihad Janes spread fear in suburban US.” 
361 United States v. Colleen R. LaRose, Criminal No. 10-Cr-123, 5. 
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Documents 
Yes. Because the FBI already knew that LaRose sought to use passports in 
support of her conspiracy, the knowledge of her possession of a stolen passport was good 
enough to earn LaRose a charge of attempted identity theft to facilitate terrorism.363  
3.  Was the information shared in order to attract other useful information? 
Interpersonal Interaction 
Unknown. It is not clear if the personal accounts from Gorman or the neighbors 
were shared beyond the media to aid in investigation. 
Inernet-Based 
Yes. While FBI spokesmen have not formally confirmed it, several sources 
indicate that information sharing occurred between the volunteer Web monitoring group 
and the FBI.364  Philadelphia U.S. Attorney Patrick Meehan stated: "I'm aware and know 
that there certainly was a role in this case served by such a group in alerting the federal 
authorities."365 
Incident Reports 
Yes. The FBI reportedly tracked LaRose’s European travels to Ireland.  Working 
with Irish counterterrorism officials there, the FBI was able to identify LaRose’s co-
conspirators who may have been involved in a larger plot than just killing the Swedish 
cartoonist.366 
Documents 
Unknown. Available sources do not indicate to what extent knowledge of the 
stolen passport was shared with partner agencies.    
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against/14094753-1.html (accessed November 1, 2010). 
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Assessment.  While much has been gathered from LaRose’s indictment and press 
releases, more details of her activities and those of the investigators are likely to surface 
once prosecution is complete.  This case clearly demonstrates, however, the broader 
nature of Internet exploitation.  In fact, it was open source monitoring in its purest sense 
that tipped off the authorities.  A civilian activist group that flags jihadist Internet videos 
and posts on open forums with nothing more than a standard Web browser keyed in on 
“JihadJane” long before the FBI and subsequently reported her escalating activity.  
Though such groups may be controversial, U.S. Attorney Meehan did offer an interesting 
perspective, saying that “online tipsters are natural descendants of the ‘eyes and ears’ 
community contacts who tipped off police to crime rackets, drug deals, and other 
impending crimes.”367  In this case, online tips of information enabled the authorities to 
track LaRose, reveal other important indicators, and discontinue her jihadist conspiracy. 
L. FINDINGS 
The analysis of these 10 cases has revealed several insights into the factors that 
have contributed to the successful disruption of homegrown jihadist plots.  As evidenced, 
all were thwarted through a combination of indicators that gave authorities sufficient 
understanding of a credible threat and the legal justification to intervene.  Because the 
circumstances in each case were so varied, it is difficult to claim any one indicator or 
technique as preeminent.  This analysis did, however, achieve the goal of illuminating the 
contributions made by open source exploitation of the Internet.  In many cases the 
information collected from jihadist Web forums or social networking sites was assessed 
to be proof of intent to carry out or incite violence.  While many of the details of the 
collection and analytical processes remain unclear, the value of the detection technique is 
validated.  What follows now are a number of key findings drawn from the analysis. 
Confidential informants and undercover agents remain invaluable sources of 
information.  A majority of the cases reflected the overwhelming contribution made by 
confidential sources.  Indeed, the classic tactic that has served law enforcement so well in 
criminal investigations has proven viable in confronting homegrown jihad.  Yet as noted 
                                                 
367 Larry King, “Web-monitoring groups didn't take ‘JihadJane' seriously at first.” 
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in some of the analyses, the risks still remain high and the chances of successfully 
inserting an “inside man” are unpredictable.  The track record and expected payoff, 
however, are likely to serve as reasonable justifications to continue the tactic. 
Personal relationships and public awareness are still important in understanding 
radicalization.  Of the cases evaluated, none had their investigations initiated by tips 
from family, friends, or other close civil ties.  However, the character and behavior 
accounts that were reported to the media (and to the authorities in some known cases) in 
the aftermath provided a glimpse into the lives of those American citizens and residents 
who aspired to conduct acts of terrorism.  Though such accounts may not be enough to 
establish a concrete profile of those on the path to radicalization, they do contribute to a 
growing body of research that seeks to increase awareness at the interpersonal level.  
Open source exploitation of the Internet has become a viable means for 
identifying homegrown threats and evaluating terrorist intent.  The data shows that 
agencies like the FBI have adopted Internet monitoring as a gateway into jihadist 
operating space.  Because they recognize that the Internet serves as an important vehicle 
for would-be jihadists, authorities have countered by using the same tool to identify 
networks of actors, evidence of communication, and violent intent.  With the help of 
behavioral analysts and linguists, authorities are able to evaluate credibility and 
synthesize into intelligence what may on the surface appear to be nothing more than 
online chatter. 
Private Web monitoring organizations have played a significant role in 
identifying homegrown threats and assisting prosecution.  Specialists from private 
organizations have on more than one occasion infiltrated and monitored hard-to-find 
jihadist Web forums and tracked serious actors.  Because these specialty organizations 
focus solely on jihadist Internet activity, they have built an indispensable base of 
knowledge that has provided law enforcement and prosecution with important contextual 
analyses, cultural background and actionable intelligence. 
Community-based Web monitoring groups supplement the search for homegrown 
jihadists.  The recent case of “JihadJane” demonstrates the power of civilian all-volunteer 
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groups intent on doing their part to counter radical activity and violence.  Though they 
may not be technically trained or equipped, they represent a sort of ‘neighborhood watch’ 
that may provide authorities with context clues.  While Internet vigilantes are likely not 
the final answer in detecting homegrown jihadists, there is value in listening to 
community members who are attune to the Internet environment.     
Future plot disruptions will be contingent on information sharing and interagency 
cooperation.  Regardless of how information is collected, embracing a multilateral 
approach that fosters information sharing among federal, state, and local agencies and the 
communities they serve will increase the chances of thwarting an attack or conspiracy in 
a timely manner.  The case study analysis has shown that FBI-led Joint Terrorism Task 
Forces across the nation have met success due to cooperation with partner agencies, 
private firms, the American public, and in some cases international partners.  This 
suggests that there has been progress among the intelligence and law enforcement 
communities since 9/11 to cooperatively develop an effective domestic counterterrorism 
apparatus.   
   
































Global response to the aftermath of 9/11 set about a change in the threat of 
jihadist terrorism.  Al Qaeda’s ideological influence was no longer confined to a location 
oceans away.  Though the danger of Al Qaeda persists, the rise of homegrown jihadist 
actors—American citizens and residents—has prompted the need for effective domestic 
counterterrorism measures.  As introduced in Chapter I, terror within the homeland is not 
a new phenomenon.  Authorities have long battled violent left and right-wing 
organizations and extreme environmentalist groups, and continue to do so.  What sets 
those groups apart from the homegrown jihadist, however, is that the latter is 
indiscriminate and seeks to inflict mass casualties.  Furthermore, the Internet has become 
a prominent means by which jihadists operationalize their radical behavior, using the 
technology to spread violent propaganda, transfer funds, conduct targeting, and 
coordinate their attacks.  Consequently, more attention has been paid to the Internet 
environment. 
Chapter II discussed in detail the evolution of concern regarding jihadist use of 
the Internet.  Notably, the tracking of terrorist Internet activity began before 9/11, 
predominantly by the terrorism research community.  While early studies focused on 
established international organizations, researchers soon discovered an evolution in the 
jihadist movement.  The Internet appeared to be an empowering tool that promoted 
decentralization as a means of maintaining the terror campaign.  Though it was not 
immediate, the U.S. Intelligence Community, including the FBI, caught on to the 
growing trend.  Several assessments beginning in the mid-1990s and continuing to the 
present demonstrate that the IC has traced the shifting character of terrorism within the 
homeland.  Key intelligence judgments have suggested that those in counterterrorism turn 
to the very forums where homegrown radicalization thrives. 
Chapter III described the prominent challenges of collecting and using Internet 
information as a means to identify homegrown jihadist threats.  Because it is largely 
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ungoverned, the Internet environment can often lead to the problem of information 
overload.  Language and cultural skill deficiencies can hinder the ability to evaluate 
online information, and if those obstacles are overcome, there remains the difficult task 
of determining the information’s credibility.  There are also a number of organizations 
charged with counterterrorism that may or may not be well-suited for exploiting open 
source Internet information, therefore stressing the importance of effective information 
sharing.  Finally, there are concerns about how this technique affects American privacy 
and civil liberty.   
Chapter IV addressed the primary question this thesis sought to answer: Does 
open source exploitation of the Internet provide an effective means for identifying 
homegrown jihadist threats?  Two hypotheses were posed, one stating that the detection 
technique is merely a foundation for the more effective classified approaches, and the 
other stating that the technique is in fact a considerably effective means for assessing 
homegrown threats.  Indeed, the analysis has demonstrated that the answer to the 
question lies somewhere in the middle.  Internet exploitation, as a stand-alone capability, 
can detect signs of homegrown jihadist activity and, in a supporting role, provide 
significant contextual information that supplements that which is derived from riskier 
confidential measures, such as the use of informants and undercover agents. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the findings of this study, there are several recommendations for 
increasing the effectiveness of open source Internet exploitation as a viable technique to 
detect home grown jihadist threats: 
• Provide increased funding to support the growth of the FBI’s cyber 
investigative technology and the number of analysts. 
• Invest in and integrate innovative open source technologies like the Dark Web 
research project and social network analytical tools. 
• Develop sustainable partnerships with private open source centers and educate 
state and local authorities of those organizations’ utility. 
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• Renew emphasis on recruiting and/or developing both analysts and law 
enforcement specialists with foreign language skills and cultural expertise. 
• Train analysts to identify linguistic patterns and phraseology consistent with 
jihadist rhetoric. 
• View community-based Web monitoring groups as another extension of 
‘neighborhood watch’ and provide recognition when their alerts prove helpful. 
• Conduct frequent congressionally-mandated checks on Internet exploitation 
measures to ensure infringement on America privacy and civil liberty is 
minimized. 
• Establish detailed measures of effectiveness and promote regular reviews of 
all detection techniques to ensure the United States is appropriately resourcing 
those tools and techniques that best keep its citizens safe from jihadist terrorist 
attacks. 
By smartly embracing Internet exploitation as a valuable detection technique, intelligence 
and law enforcement officials can continue to adopt a proactive, intelligence-driven 
approach that seeks to preempt violent attacks and conspiracies perpetrated by American 
homegrown jihadists.      
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